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Abstract
Missile seekers are becoming increasingly more capable of using Doppler Beam Sharp-
ening (DBS) modes as part of the homing cycle, which requires new countermeasures
against this mode. One type of countermeasure, is to create false targets within the seeker
DBS image. This thesis presents two implementation methods to insert false targets into
DBS images. Both methods are used to create false targets at a precise location within
a seeker DBS image, but are implemented in different ways. The first method proposes
repeat jamming with a time-varying delay, whilst the second proposes a fixed delay and
adding a specific Doppler shift to received waveforms. The effects of tracking errors on
the position of the false target are analysed, both analytically and with simulations and
used to assess the practical implementation of the jamming scheme. An experimental
DBS system was built to test the effectiveness of the jamming scheme against a platform
moving in steps and assess errors caused by incorrectly estimating the seeker trajectory.
The overall result of the thesis is that using the derived jamming methods, false targets
can be created at specific locations in the DBS image of the victim radar, providing the





List of Figures vi
List of Tables ix
List of Abbreviations x
List of Symbols xii
Acknowledgements xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Thesis Structure & Novel Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Published Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Literature Review 16
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Countering a Missile Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 General Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Doppler Beam Sharpening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 DRFM Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Background Theory 30
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Detection Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Doppler Beam Sharpening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Taking DBS Images with Hardware 66
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Overview of Experimental System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3 Taking DBS Images with a USRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
iv
CONTENTS v
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Generating False Targets Against DBS Modes 87
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 General Geometry and Signal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.3 Jamming Theory and Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.4 Testing Jamming Scheme Without Antenna Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Testing Jamming Scheme with DBS Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Assessment of Errors in False Targets 131
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2 Measurement Error Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.3 Initial Phase of Jammer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7 General Conclusion and Future Work 147
7.1 General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
References 154
Appendix A Rail Accuracy Verification 164
Appendix B Cross-Range Errors - Simulated Results 165
List of Figures
2.1 Range and Cross-Range Resolution for Real Beam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Range and Cross-Range Resolution for Doppler Beam Sharpened Beam . . . . 21
2.3 General Example of Cross-Range Resolution for the Real-Beam, DBS
and SAR, with Increasing Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Optimised Trajectory for DBS [Farooq & N. Limebeer, 2002], c© [2002]
IEEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Schematic of the Jamming Technique [Wang & Cai, 2007], c© 2007 IEEE 28
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In the context of evolution and natural selection, deception is often an advantageous trait
for survival. Biologically speaking, deception is to falsely communicate information in a
way that tends to benefit the communicator [Mitchell & Thompson, 1986]. This decep-
tion could be in the form of mimicry, where a species tries to appear like another species
to lure prey or avoid predators. For example, the North American Monarch Butterfly is
toxic and has a colourful warning which birds recognise as it being inedible. However, the
Viceroy Butterfly is edible to birds, but displays the same warnings as the North American
Butterfly to avoid predation [Bond & Robinson, 1988].
Deception could be in the form of false alarm calls to gain food or access to the opposite
sex for mating. For example, the Fork-Tailed Drongo (a bird found south of the Sahara
Desert) acts as a sentinel for Meerkats to help them avoid predators. However, the Drongo
also issues false-alarm calls when the meerkats find food which causes them to abandon
their catch to avoid predators. The bird then swoops in and steals the meal [Flower, 2011].
Deception in everyday human life is common and used for a variety of reasons. When
looking for a sexual partner, humans often change their behaviour to try to appear more
desirable to the person they are interested in. For example, humans might try to appear
more socially outgoing , fun, better groomed, more fashionable, or perhaps try to make
anatomical features appear more desirable. Deception in sport is actively encouraged and
1
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often a vital part of winning, such as feigning to go one direction but actually going an-
other, performing a ‘dummy’ pass in ball games like football or rugby, etc.
Humans might use deception to throw surprise parties for friends and loved ones or hide
the identity of a gift to maintain surprise for the recipient. Deception is also a vital part of
nefarious activities such as committing crimes and trying to evade arrest by law enforcers,
by removing evidence or links to the perpetrator. Regardless of whether there was con-
scious intent to deceive or if the deception was selected due to a unique advantage over
competitors, it is a trait that can often mean the difference between life and death to many
creatures found on Earth.
It is widely known that bats use SONAR (SOund NAvigation and Ranging) to avoid ob-
stacles and hunt for food. Their target recognition in clutterous environments is so sophis-
ticated, that humans have studied their echolocation calls with a view to improve our own
wireless systems [Balleri et al., 2009]. However, by relying on this method for navigation
and hunting, bats have been made vulnerable to jamming from their prey. Some species
of Tiger Moth have developed tymbal organs, which can be used to produce a series of
clicks capable of decreasing the effectiveness of the bat’s hunting [Corcoran et al., 2010].
Nature and the process of natural selection have shown that deception is a necessary part
of organic life, especially in conflict. For humans, conflict can be a daily occurrence,
lying within a spectrum of severity ranging from minor traffic violations to nuclear war.
In order to win any war, deception is a fundamental necessity.
When deception of any form is used so commonly in nature and humans, it is inevitable
that deception would also be used in war. So much so that if a side did not use deception
of any forms, they would most likely lose the war they were fighting. To quote the famous
general, Sun Tzu, ‘All warfare is based on deception’ [Sunzi & Clavell, 1981]. Deception
in battle has been used ever since battles were fought. Famous examples of this being
the Trojan horse in The Trojan War around 1200 BC, or Operation Fortitude which the
Allies used in World War II. Operation Fortitude was a large scale plan to try to make
the Germans think the Normandy invasions were going to happen at Norway (Fortitude
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North) and Pas de Calais (Fortitude South) instead of Normandy [Barbier, 2007].
The ability to communicate with each other during war is a vital commodity and so it is
unsurprising that wireless communications were used in war just a few years after being
experimentally tested for the first time. The Italian engineer Gugliemo Marconi (1874 -
1937) is considered by many to be the pioneer of radio communications and it was his
designs that were first used in war. After successfully proving the principle of wireless
communication, he moved to England in 1896. In the same year, he demonstrated his
system on the Salisbury plains in Wiltshire [Corazza, 1998]. Then in 1897, he transmit-
ted and received messages between Lavernock, Vale of Glammorgan (Wales) and the Isle
of Flatholm (Bristol Channel), which is approximately 15 km in distance. He was sup-
ported by Welshman Sir William Preece, Chief Engineer for the Post Office, who enabled
Marconi’s experiments by securing funding and giving Marconi access to the Post Of-
fice’s Equipment [Institution of Civil Engineers (Great Britain), 1914]. Once he had the
equipment, Marconi moved quickly and in 1898 he fitted his communication systems to
a number of ships including the ‘Osborne’, which Queen Victoria used to communicate
with the Prince of Wales from Osborne House in the Isle of Wight. This gave rise to
possibly the first radio SOS distress signal in 1899 which was transmitted by the lightship
‘East Goodwin’ when she collided with a steamboat in fog [Corazza, 1998].
During 1899, the Royal Navy successfully demonstrated radio communication at a maxi-
mum range of approximately 136 km aboard the HMS Alexandra, HMS Europa and HMS
Juno, with Marconi himself aboard the Juno [Austin, 1995]. It was after these successful
tests that the British decided to send radio sets and six engineers from Marconi’s com-
pany to help fight the Boer War which was the first war to use wireless communications
[Austin, 1995]. The military benefits of wireless beyond visual range communication
was revolutionary and the British military used this technology in war just three years
after Marconi demonstrated a basic prototype.
Since radio communication conception, the concept of electronic warfare was created.
One of the first recorded cases of deliberate radio jamming was in 1901, where an Ameri-
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can telecomms company deliberately jammed their competitor’s broadcast transmissions,
so only they could report the status of the Americas Cup Yacht race instead of the competi-
tion [R. Schroer, 2003]. This refers back to the previous points about the use of deception
in nature and by humans. In order to gain an advantage for survival, which in this case
was for monetary gain, deception was used to ensure victory for the telecomms company
in terms of gaining the reporting rights to the race.
Radar is an Acronym which stands for RAdio Detection And Ranging and the term was
coined by the US Navy in 1940 [Gebhard, 1979]. The first radar ever built was the ‘Tele-
mobiloskop’, which was developed by Christian Hülsmeyer in 1903 and publicly demon-
strated in 1904 in Köln, Germany [Griffiths et al., 2019]. The demonstration successfully
detected a barge located several hundred metres in range. However, the device was much
more capable than that and also successfully detected ships at a range of 3000 m, with a
wavelength around 40-50 cm [Swords, 1986] on a different test. This working prototype
gained no further funding and [Griffiths et al., 2019] postulated that this may be due to
the advances in radiotelegraphy by Marconi or partially due a shipping industry recession.
Only after after a speech by Marconi at the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in
1922, was the idea of detecting objects by transmitting electromagnetic waves revisited
[James, 1989].
Prior to the start of World War II in 1935, the German Luftwaffe had thousands of state-
of-the-art aircraft which dwarfed the Royal Air Force (RAF) both in terms of size and
capability. This led to the first meeting of the ‘Committee for the Scientific Survey of
Air Defence’ which was chaired by Sir Henry Tizard. The committee tasked Sir Robert
Watson-Watt to research if it was possible to incapacitate approaching German pilots or
render the aircraft useless before they took off. Early in 1935, Watson-Watt produced a
memorandum dismissing the idea of a ‘Death Ray’. His reckoning was that to heat a 75
kg man with a cross-sectional area of 1 m2, it would require a transmitter with 5 GW
of power and was therefore not a feasible option [Austin, 1999]. To give a scale of this
power, Hinkley point C, a modern nuclear power station scheduled to be operational in
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2025, will have a capacity of 3.2 GW [Department for Business, 2018].
This research gave the idea that the highly reflective metallic aircraft could be used to
reflect sufficient incident energy back towards a receiver to detect it. This led to Watson-
Watt’s second memorandum ‘Detection and Location of Aircraft by Radio Methods’,
which was delivered to the Air Ministry on 12th February 1935 [Brown, 1994] and gave
birth to Britain’s first radar system.
The committee moved quickly and on the 26th February 1935, the famous ‘Daventry Ex-
periment’ was undertaken. This was a bistatic radar system, using the British Broadcast-
ing Corporation (BBC) transmitter tower as the transmitter of opportunity and an aircraft
flying back and fourth as the target [Griffiths, 2016]. The first large-scale radar in Britain
was the ‘Chain Home’ system, which was built by the British and became operational in
1939 [Martin, 1988]. Chain Home was a network of air defence radars scattered across
the South and East of the English coastline and played a vital role in securing victory for
the Royal Air Force in the Battle of Britain. Such is the nature of warfare, the Germans
developed a bistatic radar, ‘Klein Heidelberg’, which used the Chain Home system as its
transmitter [Griffiths, 2017]. Radar became such a vital part of the war that the British
launched ‘The Bruneval Raid’ (Operation BITNG), to document and capture as much
of a German radar as possible [Griffiths, 2014]. The radar in question was a Würzburg
type which was primarily used as an air defence radar. The daring raid was conducted
as the Allies needed to know more about German radar technology and to gain tactical
insights which could be exploited, through what we now refer to as Electronic Counter
Measures (ECM). Electronic Warfare was used extensively on D-Day (6th June 1944),
to try to deceive the Germans into believing the landings were not going to the five in-
tended beaches of Normandy (Omaha, Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword) but instead to Pas
de Calais and Cap d’Antifer [Griffiths, 2015]. This was achieved using a combination of
ingenious techniques. Examples being the use of using Filbert Balloons (which had large
corner reflectors inside them to give the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of a 5000 Tonne ship),
‘Moonshine’ repeater jammers, chaff, stereo systems (to provide all the right sounds of
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an incoming fleet) and attacks on specific German radar stations. The Moonshine jam-
mer was a repeater jammer that downconverted the incoming signal to an intermediate
frequency and passed the signal through a liquid acoustic delay cell [Griffiths, 2015]. The
signals were then converted to acoustic and passed through an array of wires (to give the
desired range delays) before conversion back to an electrical signal, upconversion to RF
and then re-transmission.
Due to the World War II effort, radar was rapidly improved from all sides and cemented
the use of radar in modern military and civilian tracking and guidance systems. As well as
the significant radar development, WWII also saw the world’s first radio-control guided
missiles used in combat. Nikola Tesla’s radio controlled vessel, which was demonstrated
in New York, 1898, [Marincic & Budimir, 2008] paved the way for remotely controlled
machines and this concept inevitably became a vital asset to militaries around the world.
In July 1943, the Allies launched Operation ‘Husky’ which was an invasion of Sicily,
Italy. During this invasion, the Germans successfully used Henschel HS 293 missiles to
sink two ships, the ‘Duchess of York’ and the ‘California’. The Henshel HS 293 was a
radio-controlled jet-powered missile [Saxon, 2003], which required the weapon operators
to maintain visual contact during the missile’s entire flight time.
The radio-control system for the HS 293 was the Kehl/ Strassbourg system. It was de-
signed to operate on any one of 18 pre-determined frequencies, separated by 100 kHz
bands, between a carrier frequency of 48-50 MHz [Piccirillo, 1997]. The separation of
operating frequencies enabled up to 18 missiles to be launched at the same time, but also
reduced the effectiveness of the Allied jammers. The multiple frequencies were effective
at defeating jammers on at least one occasion. On 26th November 1943, the Germans
sank the British transport ship HMT Rohna. The jammers on board US destroyers USS
Jones and USS Davies were unable to cope with the many different operating frequencies
from the salvo of missiles launched, resulting in the jamming being unsuccessful [Piccir-
illo, 1997]. Since guided missiles debuted in World War II, they have been in continuous
development and there is now a large suite of different types and guidance systems in use.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
There are now many types of active missiles which can acquire targets using their own
sensors, or semi-active which use a combination of the seeker sensor and another trans-
mitter, to guide the missile to the target. There are also an increasing number of missile
guidance systems which use infrared seekers to acquire and navigate to targets. All mil-
itary systems in use inevitably require countermeasure development against the specific
technique in question and this is not just limited to radar systems.
The defence company MBDA Ltd are currently testing a new infrared anti-ship missile
‘Sea Venom’ [MBDA, 2018]. Whilst this is a separate event and coincidental timing,
the United States awarded a $3.1Billion infrared countermeasures contract to Northrop
Grumman at a similar time [Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2018]. Regardless of the
sensor a missile uses, militaries across the world will inevitably develop counter measures
to missile threats. This created the field of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) which
in turn has given rise to the field of Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM), to
counter the counter measures. This shows there is an ongoing game of ‘Cat and Mouse’
for seeker system designers and ECM designers.
ECM is used with many types of systems, such as infrared, sonar and radar, but this thesis
focuses on ECM specifically against a radar seeker system. Radar seeker jamming can
be defined as transmitting electromagnetic radiation which in some way, reduces the abil-
ity of the seeker to guide the missile to its intended target. This can be achieved using
a variety of different methods which could be used in unison or separately. The jam-
ming waveform can be transmitted to deny the seeker the opportunity to detect a target
by transmitting ‘noisy’ waveforms, which reduces the ability of the seeker to distinguish
between background noise and valid echoes from targets. A jamming waveform can also
be used to create false targets, reducing the probability of the seeker hitting the correct
target. Alternatively, the waveform can be used to change the shape of an existing target
so the seeker target recognition algorithm ignores it. There are many types of missile
seeker, both in-service and in development by the British armed forces and defence in-
dustries. Advanced missiles can switch between different radar modes during the homing
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
cycles. Jamming some of these modes such as Monopulse radars whilst the seeker does
an area search has been intensely studied. With increasingly superior hardware and target
recognition algorithms, missile seekers are now capable of utilising radar imaging modes
such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) which is
a primitive, but time and processing efficient form of SAR [Stansfield, 2016].
Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a crude radar imaging technique that uses the rel-
ative motion between the target and the platform, to resolve targets or dominant scat-
terers within the same target in cross-range by exploiting the Doppler effect [Stimson
et al., 2014]. Whilst it is quite an old technique (invented in 1951 by Carl Wiley [Wi-
ley, 1985]) it is now being used in missiles [Stansfield, 2016], naval radars and in the
automotive industry [Daniel et al., 2018]. Missile seekers benefit from using DBS, as
it sufficiently improves azimuth resolution without being computationally expensive like
Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR). DBS images are typically much faster to obtain than
SAR images and easier to analyse, whereas SAR tends to have a vastly superior azimuth
resolution and focus. As a generic example, DBS can be performed with a dwell time in
the order of tens of milliseconds, whereas SAR is in the order of whole seconds [Stim-
son et al., 2014]. DBS is sometimes referred to as an ‘unfocused’ SAR mode [Lacomme
et al., 2001] and in this thesis, SAR is assumed to be focused. DBS uses short dwell times,
resulting in approximations which enable non-linear Doppler terms to be neglected. This
will be presented in Chapter 3. The result of these approximations is that for SAR, the
cross-range resolution is independent of range, but for DBS, the cross-range resolution is
a function of range.
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It will be shown in Chapter 2 that there is a significant gap in the Electronic Counter
Measures (ECM) against DBS techniques. Whilst the technique was developed in 1951,
there is little if any unclassified literature about jamming such techniques. This thesis
investigates how to insert a false target into a DBS image and what the effects and impli-
cations are of estimating various aspects of the scenario (e.g waveform, missile trajectory,
etc.) incorrectly. This has been achieved by creating novel jamming schemes and testing
these schemes through computer simulations and experiments in the laboratory.
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1.1 Research Questions
This PhD studies how to jam a missile seeker which uses DBS modes and the effects
and implications of not estimating seeker parameters correctly. There are a number of
questions to answer and the order of these questions is as follows:
How to insert false targets into a DBS Image?
There is little if any unclassified literature detailing how to insert false targets into a DBS
image. Chapter 5 presents an overview on how to insert false targets into a DBS image
using repeat jamming when all parameters of the seeker (such as carrier frequency, PRF,
bandwidth, velocity, trajectory, etc.) are known.
What are the effects of incorrect estimations of velocity and position?
In a real military scenario, the jammer could have little or no prior knowledge of the
victim radar. It therefore must rely on real-time estimations of the victim parameters to
effectively jam the seeker to cause a desired effect. Chapter 6 investigates the effects of
incorrect parameter estimations on the images that the jammer is trying to interfere with.
This is in terms of quality of the false target, location, Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), etc.
How accurate do estimations need to be?
When the effects and implications of erroneous estimations are known, the next step is to
understand which errors have the biggest impact on the desired outcome of the jammed
DBS image, which is investigated in Chapter 6. This can help to make better decisions
when trading off accuracy for real time speed in designing jamming systems.
What is the probability of the seeker accepting or rejecting a false target?
The work for this PhD award does not assess the probability of a seeker acquiring the
correct target in the presence of jamming. Target classification algorithms are often highly
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classified which makes them difficult to study, but it is also a field in its own right and
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. This could however be a natural progression of
future work. Once a method for creating targets has been achieved and errors analysed, it
is then a logical next step to assess how the targets would be perceived by a seeker and if
errors in jamming increased or decreased the probability of a seeker accepting the target
as valid.
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1.2 Thesis Structure & Novel Contributions
CH. 1 - Introduction: This is a general introduction to radar and radar jamming from a
historical and philospohical perspective, to give a broader context of electronic warfare
and radars in general.
CH. 2 - Literature Survey: This literature survey covers general jamming against track-
ing radars and research into Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jamming sys-
tems. The main focus of the survey is inserting false targets into Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) and how DBS is being used in civilian and military applications.
CH. 3 - Background Theory: The background theory of how a general purpose radar is
presented, as well as basic jamming principles. The chapter then specifically details why
DBS is used, how it is used and how to take a DBS image, from first principles.
CH. 4 - Experimental Setup: In order to take DBS images, platform motion is required
to create the desired Doppler shifts. A linear rail was constructed to slide an antenna
across an aperture, to both take DBS images and jam them. The chapter details how
the rail was constructed, tested and validated to take measurements for the thesis. This
chapter formed part of the novel contributions of this thesis, as it was main experimental
setup for the results obtained in Chapters 5 and 6.
CH. 5 - Inserting False Targets into a DBS Image: The chapter details two methods of
implementation to insert false targets into DBS images. The first method proposes repeat
jamming with a time-varying delay, the second details how to create false targets at a
precise location within a seeker DBS image, by both delaying and adding a Doppler shift
to received waveforms. The first method is tested with simulations and the second was
tested with both simulations and measurements with the DBS system detailed in Chapter
4.
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CH. 6 - Effects of Errors in Trajectory Estimation: Chapter 5 details the required
parameters about the seeker trajectory to insert a false target into the seeker DBS image.
This chapter describes the effects of tracking errors on the position of the false target.
This is analysed analytically, with simulations and with experimental results. The results
are used to assess the practical implementation of the second jamming scheme.
CH. 7 General Conclusion and Future Work: Whilst each chapter will be concluded
and summarised, this short chapter draws an overall conclusion and details where the
thesis stands in the broader context of jamming scenarios. It also details what research
the thesis did not cover and what needs to studied to build on the thesis.
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1.3 Published Research
1.3.1 Conference Papers
Sensor Signal Processing for Defence 2017
Frazer, G., Balleri, A., and Jacob, G. (2017). “Simulations of Repeat Jamming against
Anti-Ship Missile Seekers Which Use Doppler Beam Sharpening Modes”. In 2017 Sen-
sor Signal Processing for Defence Conference (SSPD) (pp. 1–5). London: IEEE. [Frazer
et al., 2017].
Presented at the 2017 Sensor Signal Processing for Defence Conference (SSPD), Lon-
don (UK). This paper detailed the first implementation method to create false targets in
DBS images and is explained in Section 5.3.1.
IEEE Radar Conference 2019
Frazer, G., Balleri, A., and Jacob, G. S. (2019). “Deception Jamming Against Doppler
Beam Sharpening Radars”. In 2019 IEEE Radar Conference (Radar- Conf) (pp. 1–6).
Boston: IEEE. [Frazer et al., 2019]
Presented at the 2019 IEEE Radar Conference, Boston (USA). This paper detailed the
second implementation method to create false targets in DBS images and is explained in
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.
1.3.2 IEEE Access Journal
G. Frazer, A. Balleri and G. Jacob, “Deception Jamming Against Doppler Beam Sharp-
ening Radars,” in IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 32792-32801, 2020. [Frazer et al., 2020]
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Accepted to the IEEE Access journal in February 2020. This paper detailed a rigourous
mathematical detail of the second implementation method to create false target in a DBS




This PhD studies jamming novel Radio Frequency (RF) missile seekers which use DBS
as part of the homing cycle.
This can be achieved in several ways. One method is noise jamming, which aims to in-
crease the noise power in the victim radar system. If the noise power is sufficiently high
enough, the jammer will have denied the victim radar the opportunity to detect any tar-
gets through the noise. A jamming waveform can also be used to create multiple false
targets to reduce the probability of the seeker hitting the correct target. Alternatively, the
waveform can be used to cause angular displacement in the seeker. Angular displacement
refers to the jamming waveform causing the seeker to track a target which is in a different
location to where it actually is, therefore saving the target from destruction.
This literature survey reviews existing jamming techniques against tracking and imaging
radars and applications of DBS to military and civilian scenarios. It will be shown that
deception jamming against SAR radars has been studied in part, but there is a distinct gap
in the literature investigating how to jam DBS radars.
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2.2 Countering a Missile Threat
Hard Kill
Instead of using decoys or electronic warfare to counter the missile threat, navies around
the world have the option of physically destroying the missile by shooting at it with mis-
siles (e.g. Sea Viper, Sea Ceptor), projectile weapons (e.g. Phalanx CIWS) or by using
Laser Directed Energy Weapons (LDEW) (e.g. UK Dragonfire). Sea Viper (fitted to Type
45 Destroyers) and Sea Ceptor (Type 26 Frigates) are long range anti-air missile sys-
tems, designed to destroy incoming high velocity targets. These missiles are examples of
systems that the Royal Navy has to defend ships against missile threats but their charac-
teristics are beyond the scope of this thesis. Should a long range kill option fail, the close
range (≈2 km) Gatling guns are also effective against incoming threats. Raytheon’s Pha-
lanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) is a radar controlled Gatling gun which is designed
to engage and destroy multiple threats such as missiles, drones, etc [Navy, 2017].
Soft Kill
If hard kill options are not successful or available to a defending ship, decoys offer a
soft kill option. Soft kill means that the missile threat is destroyed by allowing it to
hit a low value target such as a decoy. Two types of expendable decoys are Lockheed
Martin’s ‘Nulka’ and Leonardo’s ‘BriteCloud’. The Nulka is a ship-launched active decoy
that is designed to replicate a ship’s Radar Cross Section (RCS) and provide a larger,
more appealing target than the platform it is trying to protect [Lockheed Martin, 2017].
Britecloud is a small and lightweight active expendable decoy that is launched from fast
jet and fixed winged aircraft. It is a Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) based
jammer, that is used to steer the missile away from the protected platform [LEONARDO,
2017]. With this being an off-board decoy, it removes the problem of ‘Home-On-Jam’
(HOJ) mode, which on-board jammers are at risk of. HOJ mode means that the jammer
has been detected by the seeker and the seeker passively homes onto the jamming signal
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instead of actively transmitting its own waveforms to locate the target.
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
ECM is a broad term covering both attack and defence but is used primarily to reduce
the effectiveness of an enemy’s weapon system [Neri, 2001b]. This is not just with RF
frequencies as the term ECM covers all other spectrums from SONAR through to infra-
red. This thesis is concerned with the ECM method of countering a missile threat, as
detailed by the research questions in the previous section.
Manoeuvring
Given enough time, ships can orientate themselves to present the missile seeker with the
smallest possible RCS, to help to deny the missile the opportunity to destroy its target.
However, as missiles become increasingly faster and more advanced, the feasibility of
this option is diminishing. If near the coast, ships can stay close to the coastline or other
natural radar clutter providers, to deceive the missile.
Sacrifice
Many naval forces around the globe typically arrange their fleets with high value tar-
gets, such as aircraft carriers, being surrounded by lower value targets such as destroyers,
frigates and smaller vessels. The idea being that should an incoming missile survive the
long and short range defence systems, it might hit a lower value target instead of a high
value one. This is similar to a strategy in chess, sacrificing a lower value piece like a
knight or a bishop, to protect the queen.
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2.3 General Jamming
There are several methods to jam a monopulse radar which is a widely used tracking radar
and is employed by many modern missile seekers. Neri [Neri, 2001a] summarises a few
methods of anti-monopulse deception jamming techniques such as cross-eye jamming
and the use of decoys.
In practice, there are two types of decoy: towed and expendable. The idea behind a
towed decoy is similar to that of an air-to-air refuelling aircraft trailing a hose and drogue,
except that the beacon is a lot smaller than the drogue and is capable of transmitting wave-
forms that would attract a missile. Typically, the beacons can either be transmitting RF or
infra-red waves to attract either an RF seeker or heat seeking missile. The problem with
beaconing systems is that due to the aircraft being ahead of them, they are not effective
against oncoming missiles. If the aircraft manoeuvres to give the beaconing system sight
of the oncoming missile, the effective RCS of the aircraft could be greatly increased and
will therefore give the missile seeker a larger target to lock onto. This can make the bea-
coning system fairly useless in this situation [Neri, 2001a].
Cross-Eye Jamming (CEJ) aims to create ‘worst-case’ angular errors in monopulse radars
due to glint [Liu et al., 2015]. The problem with cross-eye jamming is that it requires
highly accurate estimation and replication of the seeker waveforms. Falk [Falk, 2007]
discusses the principles of cross-eye jamming and explains how scattering of the jam-
ming waveform by ocean waves can severely affect the performance of the jammer. The
paper also explains that cross-eye can defeat Home-On-Jam (HOJ) mode by creating a
false target for the seeker to home onto. This assumes denial jamming has been used
prior to using cross-eye to trigger HOJ mode. One of the key points of the paper is that if
implemented correctly, cross-eye jamming can be highly effective at creating false targets
in the seeker’s receiver.
A method of practically implementing cross-eye jamming is retrodirective cross-eye jam-
ming which is demonstrated in [du Plessis, 2012] and an extended analysis of retrodirec-
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tive cross-eye jamming is described in [du Plessis et al., 2009]. In order for cross-eye
jamming to be implemented, the jammer and therefore the carrying platform needs to be
illuminated by the victim radar. This means that there will also be a skin-return caused by
the jammer platform alongside the jamming waveforms at the victim receiver which can
reduce the performance of cross-eye jamming. A derivation of the cross-eye gain in the
presence of skin-returns is presented in [du Plessis, 2019].
Paik et al [Paik et al., 2014, Paik et al., 2015, Paik et al., 2016] have undertaken sev-
eral studies into noise jamming monopulse radars. They have investigated conditions in
which ‘break-lock’ of phased locked loops (PLL) in the monopulse occurs, when tracking
a target. These studies come under the denial jamming spectrum and do not investigate
deception jamming by interrupting the PLL. They are essentially investigating how to
interrupt the continuous tracking of a target in the angular domain. The PLL is used to
track frequency and therefore the angle of the target. A PLL is a negative feedback sys-
tem consisting of a voltage controlled oscillator, phase detector and loop filter to track
frequency. There is a significant amount of literature through books and papers in using
broadband and spot noise jamming against many types of radar. Therefore, broadband or
narrowband noise jamming will not be investigated further in this thesis.
2.4 Doppler Beam Sharpening
Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a technique that uses the changing Doppler, caused
by relative motion between a platform and a target, to synthetically narrow the main beam
of the radar. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the basic principle of DBS. The main beam of the
radar, will have poor cross-range resolution at a given range. With the movement of the
platform, DBS synthetically narrows the beam, improving the cross-range resolution of
the radar.
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Figure 2.1: Range and Cross-Range
Resolution for Real Beam
Figure 2.2: Range and Cross-Range
Resolution for Doppler Beam Sharpened Beam
Generally, the larger the antenna, the narrower the beamwidth. For a linear phased
array antenna to have a cross range resolution of 1m at a range of 20 km when using an
operating frequency of 36 GHz, the required antenna diameter would be approximately
83 m based on general equations from [Skolnik, 2008]. This is simply not practical for
most applications that require the use of radar. Imaging systems like DBS and Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR) enable resolution to be drastically increased, when using an an-
tenna that is constrained by the platform it serves.
The principal difference between DBS and SAR is that for SAR, the cross-range reso-
lution is independent of range, but for DBS, the cross-range resolution is a function of
range [Neri, 2006]. As DBS uses short dwell times, higher order phase terms can be ne-
glected, resulting in the general theoretical equations for DBS. These approximations will
be presented in in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3. Figure 2.3 shows the general principle of how
the cross-range resolution for real-beam, DBS and SAR changes with increasing range.
Generally, DBS has a better cross-range resolution than the real-beam and in turn, SAR
has better cross-range resolution than DBS.
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Figure 2.3: General Example of Cross-Range Resolution for the Real-Beam, DBS and
SAR, with Increasing Range
There has been research from the automotive industry to use DBS to assist self park-
ing in [Laribi et al., 2018] and resolving targets when using THz radar in [Daniel et al.,
2018]. As with most applications, due to the platform which in these cases are cars, the
antennas are smaller than desired. This is due to them having to be small enough to fit
inside the vehicle in both a practical and aesthetic way, which results in smaller antennas
and therefore wider beamwidths. Whilst designers can compensate for this using higher
frequencies (e.g. 77 GHz in [Laribi et al., 2018] or low THz range in [Daniel et al.,
2018]), DBS can improve resolution even further. For another civilian application, DBS
can be used to differentiate between the coastline and reefs or rocks, which a conventional
radar might not be able to resolve due to the superior resolution DBS provides [Kim et al.,
2011].
Missile seekers also use relatively small antennas, as they are constrained by many fac-
tors such as the missile size, weight, operating platform, etc. Missile seekers benefit from
using DBS, as it improves cross-range resolution without being computationally expen-
sive like Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) and DBS images are generally much faster to
obtain than SAR. As a generic example, DBS can be performed with a dwell time in the
order of tens of milliseconds, whereas SAR is in the order of whole seconds [Stimson
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et al., 2014]. DBS increases the cross-range resolution without being computationally
intense, which means that it can be used in real time [G. Pietrzyk et al., 2004].
DBS can also be combined with waveform diversity to have simultaneous beams per-
forming multiple functions. The research in [Newcombe & Balleri, 2014] demonstrates
the idea of using up and down linear frequency modulated (LFM) ‘chirps’, to create or-
thogonal beams whilst performing DBS for both of the beams. Using multiple beams for a
missile seeker is highly beneficial as it enables the seeker to perform multiple tasks. This
could be to scan a larger area with improved coverage, scanning an area faster than before,
or by scanning for targets with one beam and imaging the flight path with the other beam,
which could be transmitted back to the missile firing platform for intelligence gathering.
DBS requires an offset angle between the moving platform and the target, in order to
observe the changing Doppler shifts to obtain a DBS image. It is the changing Doppler
shifts that create the phase history of a target, which enables the real beam of the radar
to be sharpened; therefore DBS cannot be performed when heading directly towards a
target. This creates a problem for missiles as they will have to use a different trajectory
to perform DBS. If the offset angle is too large, the missile will have to make large turns
and lose energy, but if the offset angle is too narrow, the effectiveness of DBS is reduced.
There has been some unclassified research into optimising the trajectory of a missile
specifically to perform DBS. Rollason et al in [Rollason et al., 2003] defined an expres-
sion of the cross-range resolution for a missile taking a DBS image, in terms of the sce-
nario geometry, platform velocity and the dwell time of the scenario, which could be used
for shaping a missile trajectory optimised to take DBS images. The work in [Farooq &
N. Limebeer, 2002] optimised a missile trajectory for a seeker using DBS, which used a
curved trajectory with a climb and dive manouvre, as shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Optimised Trajectory for DBS [Farooq & N. Limebeer, 2002], c© [2002]
IEEE
These studies show that missiles can use DBS as a method of acquiring targets. As
the signal processing for DBS is similar to that of a pulse-Doppler radar, it is difficult to
know when the seeker is using this mode. However, the optimised trajectories also give a
potential method of detecting when a seeker is using the DBS mode.
It is difficult to test jamming waveforms against different seeker systems, as it is difficult
to obtain them from both allied and non-allied militaries, due to the strict classification
of such information. In addition, if a military body has such a missile capability to test
waveforms on, it is an expensive task to do this on a real-life/in-service system. It is also
worth noting that the only way to test the waveforms on enemy seekers, is after they have
been fired at the target which the jammer is trying to protect.
This leads to the fact that it is difficult to know if jamming has been successful, until it
is too late to react. For example, if an anti-ship missile switches on its homing radar at
a range of 25 km and flies at 0.8 Mach (272.2 m/s assuming International Standard At-
mosphere (ISA) conditions), the jammer has approximately 92 seconds to respond before
the missile reaches the target. These high speed scenarios require sophisticated jamming
systems, otherwise the ship will be hit by the missile if the counter measures are not suc-
cessful, as there may not be enough time to try a different method.
Due to the cost and complexity of active radar guided missiles, there are a finite number
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of designs currently in operational use by the different militaries in the world at any one
time. Logic would suggest that when a jammer is trying to jam a specific seeker of a
specific missile, the best way to develop the jammer and test its success, is to test it on
the actual seeker itself, i.e. test the waveforms on a fully built and serviceable system.
However, this is near impossible due to such systems being classified and details of the
systems being withheld from the public.
2.5 DRFM Jamming
The ability to create high fidelity copies of waveforms and modify them comes from
the use of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) systems. A DRFM can store and
modify waveforms using high-speed sampling and digital memory [De Martino, 2018].
DRFMs generally work by recording an incoming waveform, storing it and then repeat-
edly transmit the waveform back towards the victim radar periodically. It will then un-
dergo the listening/recording phase again and cycle through this loop.
The DRFM enables phase coherency which enables coherent radar modes to be jammed
such as by creating false targets in SAR images. A brief overview on using a DRFM to
create false targets in SAR images is found in [Zheng Shenghua, 2004]. The paper in-
troduces how a DRFM can be used, by intercepting the victim radar waveform, sampling
and modifying the waveform according to the desired errors and then re-transmitting the
waveform back to the victim radar.
Due to the advancements of electronics in recent years, the idea of ‘Commercially Off-
The-Shelf’ (COTS) DRFMS are becoming more feasible. Several research projects have
been undertaken to construct high speed DRFMs with COTS equipment [Heagney, 2018,
Zhang Peng, 2015, Min Xie et al., 2015]. All three papers used Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGA) to create a DRFM system. The FPGAs can utilise parallel processing,
giving the ability to develop a high-speed DRFM systems. As FPGAs are generic by
design, they can be highly customisable and are relatively inexpensive. For example, a
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development board with the FPGA chip of the ‘Xilinx Virtex7’ series can be purchased
for approximately £3k-£4k [Xilinx, 2019]. This chip is also a later model to the Virtex6
chips used in [Heagney, 2018] and [Min Xie et al., 2015]. There is a significant amount
of research output from China into the use of of DRFMs and development of DRFM
test rigs. As use of the DRFM is beoming more and more prevalent, there is also some
research into countering DRFM false targets. As previously stated in the introduction,
electronic warfare is a continous game of cat and mouse between ECM and ECCM de-
signers. A general method for using a DRFM is to record the incoming waveform and
repeat it as desired, before recording again and repeating the cycle in a loop. One method
to counteract this type of DRFM use is to jitter the PRI as suggested in [Soumekh, 2006].
Pulse diversity can also be used to effectively counter this type of DRFM, such as phase
shift keying or by varying the chirp rate or pulse width (whilst maintaining bandwidth for
constant range resolution) which was proposed in [Wei et al., 2016].
There has been some active research for creating false targets in SAR images and [Da-hai
et al., 2007] investigated how to create false targets in SAR, by modulating the received
waveform for a generic scenario. As well as investigating narrow and broadband noise
jamming (which is beyond the scope of this thesis), the research in [Harness & Budge,
2014] used a varying time delay method to create false targets in a SAR image. Using
this method is problematic, as it requires extremely precise timings in hardware as well
as knowing the transmission time (t = 0) of the scenario which is difficult to calculate
precisely. A method to create false targets in a SAR image by modulating the received
signal is shown for missile-borne SAR in [He et al., 2014] and space-borne SAR in [Sun
et al., 2014]. Both methods require knowledge of the platform trajectory, as well as the
ability to coherently modify the received waveform.
Instead of broadband or narrowband jamming, which requires higher jamming power due
to the processing gains of coherent radars, another method is to use Doppler or ‘phase
noise’ jamming. The research in [Bo Lv, 2010] presents this idea. Here, the jammer re-
ceives the seeker waveform and then multiplies that waveform by video noise, where the
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phase is randomly distributed between 0 and 2π . The amplitude of the jamming signal
varies with time and is constrained so that the noise in the seeker DBS image occupies
a distinct band in the range bins and all of the Doppler bins. This can be used to mask
the presence of a target. This method also reduces the required jammer power as there is
some processing gain from the jamming waveform due to a partial correlation. In order to
do this, a DRFM would have to be employed by the jammer in order to sample the seeker
waveform at high speeds and store in memory.
A similar effect is observed in [Hong-xu et al., 2010], where the authors propose the idea
of jittering the jammer hold-on time and multiplying the phase of the received waveform
by a noise waveform distributed between 0 and 2π . They also propose sampling only
some of the recieved waveform, so the pulse width is less than the victim radar waveform.
There will still be some processing gains in range compression due to partial correlation.
They can also transmit more jittered pulses within a single PRI to create a distinct noise
band at desired range and azimith bands. Another method of achieving a similar effect is
presented in [Huang et al., 2015]. Here the authors propose using repeat jamming with a
random delay against a SAR GMTI (Ground Moving-Target Indication) system.
As proposed in [Harness & Budge, 2014], if the jammer multiplies the seeker waveform
by a random phase and repeats it back to the seeker, a distinct Doppler band can be pro-
duced, corresponding to the range resolution of the pulse. By this, if the range resolution
is 5 m, a strip appears on the range Doppler map occupying all Doppler bins and has a
width of 5 m in the range axis.
Whilst not directly related to this thesis, there is also a little published research in jamming
bi and multistatic SAR systems. In [Wang & Cai, 2007], the authors propose transmitting
a randomly jittered copy of the received waveform from outside the scene area, to mask
the presence of targets in the scene. This requires the jammer receiver to be inside the
scene area and the employment of a DRFM to store copies of the victim radar waveforms,
as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Schematic of the Jamming Technique [Wang & Cai, 2007], c© 2007 IEEE
By transmitting copies of the victim radar waveforms into the scene from outside,
the assumed omnidirectional scattering mitigates the problem of not knowing where the
victim receiver is, due to it being passive and therefore not trackable to the radar without
prior intelligence.
In [Pan et al., 2014], the authors propose jamming a bistatic Inverse Synthetic Aperture
Radar (ISAR) system by undersampling the waveform of the victim radar in a sub-Nyquist
manner. The jammer receives a scattered echo from a moving target and then transmits
the undersampled jamming waveform at the moving target in order for the jamming wave-
form to be scattered towards the victim receiver. This form of deception jamming aims to
create multiple false targets with the number of false targets being a function of the under-
sampling rate used. The sub-Nyquist method to create multiple false targets is also used
in [Wang et al., 2014] against an ISAR system which uses Compressive Sensing (CS).
In this setup, the ISAR is in a monostatic configuration and the jammer forms a bistatic
system. The jammer receives an echo scatterered from the moving target and re-transmits
an undersampled copy of the victim radar back towards the moving target in order to be
scattered towards the victim radar receiver.
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2.6 Conclusion
At the time of thesis publication, there is no unclassified literature for jamming DBS radar
modes (apart from papers published as part of the PhD studies). If control of the position
of the false target or a focused false target is required, the jammer requires knowledge of
the victim platform trajectory to jam either SAR or DBS.
None of the cited literature details how to create a false target at a specific location within
the victim image for a platform which is operating in a DBS mode. Nor does any of
the literature explain how positional errors in the false target are induced by incorrectly
estimating the platform trajectory.
There are two distinct gaps in the literature which the PhD will focus on:
1. Inserting false targets into DBS images.





This chapter presents the background theory required to theoretically explain how a DBS
radar would operate. Several parts of this chapter are applicable to many types of radar,
but it is explained with respect to a DBS radar.
3.1.1 The Radar Range Equation
The radar range equation exists in many forms and has been used throughout the PhD
project as a ‘Rule of Thumb’ guide when making quick validation checks of simulations
and measurements from the laboratory. It therefore deserves a short introduction and





where Pt and Pr are the transmitted and received power, G is the gain of the antennas
(assuming a single antenna for both transmit and receive), σ is the target cross-sectional
area (RCS) and R is the range of the target from the radar.
The power density (denoted by S) of the radiated electromagnetic waves at the target
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which is found by treating the origin of a sphere as the transmission point of the





The gain of the antenna is the ability to focus energy in a given direction when com-





where λ is the wavelength of the transmitted radiation and Ae is the effective aperture
of the antenna. Radar Cross Section (RCS) is a measure of the fictitious area an isotropic
target would need to have in order to produce the real echo power received at the radar. For
example, the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit aircraft is a stealthy aircraft with a wingspan
in the order of 40-50 m. Due to its stealthy properties, however, it has the RCS of a small
bird [Stimson et al., 2014] which would be in the order of 0.1 m2, as opposed to an area
of tens to hundreds of square metres corresponding to its actual size.
Modelling the RCS of a complex object (e.g. a ship or aircraft) is a field of study in its
own right as there are many factors that dictate the RCS. However, if the target is assumed
to be a perfect conductor, a flat plate and observed head on with zero aspect angle, the
directional RCS, σ , of the target is given by




where w and h are the width and height of the flat plate respectively. Therefore, the power
density reflected back towards the radar can be calculated using the ratio of RCS to the
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If a single antenna is shared between transmit and receive (or if the gain of the trans-












where Pn is the average noise power of the system. In the next section, it will be shown
that
Pn = kT B (3.11)
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T the effective temperature of the noise and B is the
effective bandwidth of the noise. The effective temperature, T , is commonly expressed as
T = T0Fn (3.12)
where T0 = 290 K and Fn is the noise figure of the radar. The SNR of the echo signal
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3.2.1 Measurable Thermal Noise
Thermal noise in circuits is caused by Brownian motion of electrons due to the ambient
temperature [Connor, 1982]. Brownian being in reference to the Scottish Botanist, Robert
Brown, who in 1827 first observed that pollen suspended in water would undergo a ran-
dom “Zig-Zag” motion [Bikkin, 2013]. In the 19th Century, it was realised that this motion
was caused by molecules in the water striking the pollen, as they themselves moved due
to fluctuations in ambient temperature. In 1928, Harry Nyquist [Nyquist, 1928] formu-
lated an equation to give the mean squared voltage (variance) across a resistor, Rn, when
in thermal equilibrium at temperature T as
V̄ 2 = 4kRnT B volts (3.14)
The absolute temperature T is in Kelvin and k = 1.380650×10−23 J/K. A noisy resis-
tor can then be modelled using Thévenin’s equivalent circuit, which connects a noiseless
resistor in series with a noise generator.
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In Thévenin’s circuit, the noisy resistor, Rn, is connected in series with the noiseless
resistor, RL and the voltage generator as shown in Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.1: Thévenin’s Equivalent Circuit
As the two resistors Rn and RL are connected in series, the current across the two
resistors is the same, giving


















From Eq. (3.14) if
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The maximum-power transfer theorem states that the maximum possible power is
transferred from an internal resistance Rn to a load of resistance RL, when RL = Rn
[Haykin & Moher, 2009]. When this condition is met, the power generated by the source
is shared equally across the internal resistance of the source and the load resistance. The
power delivered to the load is referred to as the ‘available power’. Therefore the available




= kT B (3.20)
and is measured in Watts. Thévenin’s circuit can therefore be used to model noise
which is seen frequently in noise calculations.
White Gaussian Noise
White noise is a type of noise used to model thermal noise in electronic circuits. White
Noise assumes that the power spectral density is constant across all of the frequency
spectrum, which therefore gives infinite average power. This assumption holds until fre-
quencies start to reach around the 10 THz range [Connor, 1982]. The term ‘white’ is in
reference to the colour of white light, which contains equal amounts of frequencies in the
visible light section of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The justification for assuming the noise to be Gaussian is based on the central limit the-
orem. The central limit theorem essentially states that the probability distribution of ran-
dom variables tends to a Gaussian distribution when a large number of random variables
are summed together [Haykin & Moher, 2009]. For example, if the noise process is in-
finitely sampled with replacement, the resultant distribution of the noise process should
be Gaussian.
For all models in this thesis, it is also assumed that the noise process, n(t), is Wide-Sense
Stationary (WSS) unless otherwise stated. The first two moments of the process can be
used to give a partial description of a random process. The mean of a random process is
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the expected value of a random variable at a given time:
µn(t) = E[n(t)] (3.21)
A Random Process is stationary to the first order, if the mean of the process does not
change with time, and
µn(t) = µn (3.22)
A random process is stationary to the second order, if the autocorrelation function only
changes as a function of the time difference between observation times. The autocor-
relation function of a random process, is the expectation of the product of two random
variables obtained from the random process, observed at two times:
Rx(t1, t2) = E[X(t1)X(t2)] (3.23)
If the random process is stationary to the second order:
Rx(t1, t2) = Rx(t2− t1) (3.24)
or
Rx(τ) = E[X(t + τ)X(t)] (3.25)
Therefore by taking the zero value of the autocorrelation function, the mean squared value
or variance of the random process is obtained. As
Rx(0) = E[X2(t)] (3.26)
Whilst the mean and variance of a process only give a partial description, it is assumed
for the rest of the thesis that if the random process is stationary in the first and second
order, the random process is wide sense stationary (WSS) and has a Gaussian distribution
unless otherwise stated.
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This gives rise to the Einstein Wiener-Khinchtine equations which form a Fourier Trans-
form pair between the power spectral density and autocorrelation function of a WSS ran-
dom process [Haykin & Moher, 2009]. As








SN( f )ei2π f τd f (3.27)
Therefore, the zero frequency value of the PSD for a WSS random process, equals the










SN( f )d f (3.29)
Therefore, the power of a WSS random process is equal to




SN( f )d f (3.30)
3.2.2 Power Spectral Density (PSD)
The power spectral density (PSD) of white noise is




The division by two is to denote the one sided PSD of the noise where No = kTe. Te
is defined as the temperature required to maintain a noisy resistor at a temperature which
will cause it to produce the same level of noise if it is added to a noiseless version of the
same system.
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This means that the Autocorrelation function of white noise is a delta function which
is weighted by the PSD of the noise.
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3.2.3 Matched Filter
Introduction
The matched filter is a linear filter that is used to maximise the signal to noise ratio of a
received signal, in order to improve detection performance. The filter takes in a known
waveform with additive White Gaussian Noise.
The impulse response of a linear filter, h(t), is matched to the input signal. It is an image
of the transmitted waveform, as
h(t) = s∗(−t) (3.33)
In the frequency domain, the transfer function H( f ) can be calculated by taking the
Fourier Transform of the impulse response




h(t)e−i2π f tdt (3.34)
and the output of the matched filter in the frequency domain is
Y ( f ) = H( f )S( f ) (3.35)
To convert the output of the system from the frequency domain to the time domain,





Y ( f )ei2π f td f (3.36)
Maximising SNR
The matched filter is a filter that maximises the signal to noise ratio of the output signal
in white noise. The signal to noise ratio at the output of the matched filter at sample time
CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND THEORY 40







Where sro(τd) is the received signal at the output of the matched filter at time τd and
no(t) is the additive noise. The received signal at the output of the matched filter at time





H( f )S( f )ei2π f τd d f (3.38)




H( f )S( f )ei2π f td f
∣∣∣∣2 (3.39)
where H( f ) is the transfer function of the matched filter and S( f ) the spectral density of
the output signal, sro(t). The PSD of the noise at the output of the matched filter, SNo( f ),
is
SNo( f ) = SN( f )|H( f )|2 =
No
2
|H( f )|2 (3.40)
The output SNR can now be re-defined as:
SNRout =






|H( f )|2d f
(3.41)













|S( f )|2d f (3.42)
This is only equal if
H( f ) = kS∗( f ) (3.43)
where k is a constant. Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality with the expression for the
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|S( f )|2d f (3.45)




|S( f )|2d f = Signal Energy = ε (3.46)
Therefore the output SNR is equal to 2εNo . It also shows that the SNR at the output does
not depend on the design of the waveform but only on its energy.
3.3 Detection Probability
3.3.1 Introduction
Figure 3.2 shows a basic linear process of a received echo from a target and how a binary
detection process can be modelled. Noise is added to the received echo and is processed
through the matched filter. The output of the filter is then sampled and each sample is
compared against a threshold to decide one of two hypothesises.
Figure 3.2: Process of Signal Detection
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3.3.2 Neyman-Pearson Theorem
The Neyman-Pearson approach to the binary detection problem has been selected, to max-
imise the probability of detection by choosing an appropriate probability of false alarm.
The binary detection scenario consists of two hypothesises:
H 0 : so = no
H 1 : so = sro +no
(3.47)
Where sro is a received signal sample and no a Gaussian random variable obtained
from the white noise process. This gives four possible outcomes:
1. Decide H 0 when H 0 is true. (There is not a target).
2. Decide H 1 when H 1 is true. (There is a target).
3. Decide H 1 when H 0 is true. (False Alarm/Type I error).
4. Decide H 0 when H 1 is true, (Miss/Type II error).
For the purpose of this model, both hypotheses have Gaussian Probability Density Func-
tions (PDF), due to the assumption that the input noise process is white for each hypoth-
esis. That is, they are assumed to be distributed according to N (µ,σ2) where µ is the
mean, and σ2 is the variance. Where
H 0∼N (µ,σ2) H 1∼N (sro,σ2) (3.48)
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3.3.3 Variances and Hypotheses
Variance is defined as the squared deviation of a random process from its mean value.
Under H 0 , the variance can be calculated as follows:
Var(so) = E[(so−µ0)2] = σn2 (3.49)
Under H 0 , only the noise component no is present which has a mean of zero. Therefore,






|H( f )|2d f = σn2 (3.50)
Under H 1 , both the received echo from a target and the noise process is present. This
gives a variance of






|H( f )|2d f = σn2 (3.51)
Therefore, the variances of the matched filter output for both hypotheses are the same.
The mean of H 1 is the received signal sample, sro. This therefore means that the outputs
of the matched filter for each hypothesis can be shown to be
H 0 : y(t)∼N (0,σn2)
H 1 : y(t)∼N (sro,σn2)
(3.52)
3.3.4 Obtaining Probability of Detection
First, the Probability of False Alarm (PFA) is constrained by choosing a threshold:
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The Q function is the right tail probability function for Gaussian distributions. This can be
summarised by: ‘Q(γ) = The probability that a standard normal random variable exceeds










If a specific PFA is required, the threshold can be determined for a given (PFA) by
γ = µ0 +
√
σn2Q−1(PFA) (3.55)
The probability of detection, PD, is the probability of choosing H1 when H1 is true and
can be calculated by






Figure 3.3: Probability of Detection for a
Given Probability of False Alarm
Figure 3.4: Probability of Detection for a
Given Probability of False Alarm
Figure 3.3 demonstrates that for a given SNR, the probability of detection increases





However, having a high probability of detection is not particularly useful for detecting
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targets when the probability of false alarm is also high. Generally, radar systems require
the PFA to be in the order of 1× 10−8 and a PD of 0.9 or more. With this PFA, the SNR
needs to be approximately 16dB as shown in Figure 3.4.
3.3.5 Obtaining a Probability of False Alarm
The Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing, enables either a threshold or proba-
bility of false alarm to be specified, in order to calculate either one of the two parameters.
I.e.









By selecting an appropriate false alarm, the threshold for deciding which hypothesis can
therefore be calculated. Figure 3.5 shows that the number of false alarms from a sam-
pled noise set should coincide with the calculated probability figure. To estimate the false
alarm from a sampled noise set, divide the number of false alarms by the total number of
samples. This should approximate to the probability of false alarm calculated using the
Q function. Figure 3.5 presents a nominal example of using a PFA of 0.1 with 1000 sam-
ples being measured. From the example, the measured false alarm rate is 0.096, which
is approximately 0.1. As the sample size increases, the false alarm rate should approach
exactly 0.1 by using the law of large numbers.
Naturally, for a radar system in operation, such a high number of false alarms is unde-
sirable. Therefore, a much lower probability of false alarm is required around the order
of 1×10−8, which should give only 1 false alarm in 100,000,000 samples. Figure 3.6
demonstrates this.
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Figure 3.5: Measured False Alarms for
PFA = 0.1 and σn2 = 1
Figure 3.6: Measured False Alarms for
PFA = 1×10−8 and σn2 = 1
3.3.6 Noise Jamming
This section follows the scheme as depicted in Figure 3.2, but also adds a noise jamming








|H( f )|2d f (3.60)



















|H( f )|2d f (3.61)
Under H0 , only the WGN is present in the form of background noise and the jammer.







|H( f )|2d f = σT 2 (3.62)
Under H1 , the variance is going to be the same as it is in H0.
Var(so) = E[(so− sro)2] = E[(no + Jo)2] = σJ2 (3.63)
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3.3.7 Increasing the Probability of False Alarm
When H0 is true and there is not a target present, noise jamming of this type will increase
the number of false alarms to a number greater than the designed false alarm rate. This is
assuming the model assigns a threshold to decide H0 or H1, when the system is designed
and cannot adjust detection thresholds during operation. For example, in Figure 3.5, the
probability of false alarm is set to 0.1. This means that in a thousand samples, there should
be approximately one hundred false alarms. In the case of Figure 3.7, the threshold and
probability of false alarm are set to 1.2816 and 0.1 respectively. The threshold value was
calculated using Eq. (3.58). These figures are obtained by assuming that the noise power
or noise variance is one. If the noise variance is set to two, due to WGN jamming, then








The newly calculated PFA agrees with the measured number of false alarms in Figure 3.7.





The deviation from 0.18 can be accounted for by the law of large numbers in that the
sample size was not large enough to get to 0.18.
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Figure 3.7: False Alarm rate with σT 2 = 2
3.4 Doppler Beam Sharpening
3.4.1 Introduction
Modern RF seekers are becoming increasingly more capable of medium to high resolu-
tion target imaging capabilities. Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a crude imaging
radar, that was a precursor to Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). DBS uses relative motion
between the target and the platform, to resolve targets or dominant scatterers within the
same target in cross-range, by exploiting the Doppler effect.
3.4.2 Cross-Range Resolution: Real Beam Vs DBS
Modern radars used Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) antennas to transmit
and steer the illuminating beam. They consist of many elements in a variety of config-
urations, such as planar, linear, circular, etc. These elements each independently trans-
mit radiation through dedicated transmit/receive modules to create a beam pattern. This
differs from a Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) whose elements do not in-
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dependently transmit, but instead receive a feed of power generated from a single source
high-power amplifier. Both AESA and PESA antennas use electronic steering to steer the
illuminating beams, but it is generally considered that AESA is an improved version of
PESA. The benefits of an AESA antenna over a PESA is generally an increased reliability
(no single point of failure with power generation), an ability to transmit multiple beams
at different frequencies and a higher overall transmit power.
Instead of physically turning the antenna like mechanically scanned radars do, AESA an-
tennas apply phase shifts to the elements, to steer the beam in the desired direction to
illuminate the target. The benefits of using an AESA antenna, is that they are typically
more reliable as there are less moving parts (e.g. gimbals and servos) which can lead to
mechanical faults and many elements can fail before the array needs replacing. AESAs
also have better beam agility than a mechanically scanned array as they can electronically
switch to illuminate a different direction, rather than mechanically rotate the antenna to
the desired position [Stimson et al., 2014].
AESA antennas are a modern feature and older mechanically scanned arrays are being up-
graded to the modern AESA type. For example, in 2016 flight trials began [Eurofighter,
2016] for a new AESA radar on the Eurofighter Typhoon, an aircraft which entered ser-
vice with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 2003 with a mechanically scanned radar, known
as Captor-M [Royal Air Force, 2019].
One of the key design parameters of AESA antennas is the spacing between the elements.
They are typically spread apart with spacings of approximately d < λ2 . Generally, to avoid





where ∆θ is the maximum steering angle [Blake & Long, 2009a]. For a linear array
with a maximum steering angle of 60deg, d < 0.54λ . Grating lobes are the result of
aliasing, caused by undersampling in the spatial domain. The array factor is essentially
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an expression for the directivity of an antenna. Using Eq. (3.67), which is derived in
[Blake & Long, 2009b], Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show a broadside linear array factor with and














Where N is the total number of elements in the array, d is the element spacing and ϑ is the
steering angle which for these plots, is 0◦. The justification for using 36 GHz is provided
in Section 5.3.1.
Figure 3.8: 48 element linear array factor
Without Grating Lobes
Figure 3.9: 48 element linear array Factor
with Grating Lobes
One issue with AESA antennas, is that the beamwidth of the array increases with
steering or look angle. A mechanically scanned array will have a constant beamwidth,
but the greater the look angle for a steered beam, the greater the beamwidth. Using the
halfpower beam width rule, Figure 3.10 shows how beam steering can affect the angular
resolution of the radar.
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Figure 3.10: Angular Resolution of 48 element linear array with varying degrees of
beam steering
DBS can increase the cross-range resolution without being computationally intense,
which means that it can be used more easily in real time [G. Pietrzyk et al., 2004]. The
beam of the radar is synthetically narrowed using the Doppler domain. Figure 3.11 shows
an estimate of the cross-range resolutions that a real beam could achieve, if a missile uses
a phased array antenna with a diameter of 0.2 m. Each plot is calculated using the 3dB or





Where λ is the carrier wavelength, Nel is the number of elements used in the antenna and
d is the element spacing which is assumed to be half the wavelength. The number of
elements used for each of the three decreasing wavelengths is 13, 20 and 48 respectively.
The number of elements for a given antenna diameter can be increased, as the spacing
between each element decreases with decreasing lambda to maintain d = λ2 . With such
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a small antenna (due to the missile size constraints), the real beam cross-range resolution
is low, which can be improved to a medium resolution with DBS. The element spacing is
assumed to be half the wavelength to avoid grating lobes. The desired range resolution can
be achieved using pulse compression techniques. The theoretical cross-range resolution






Using a dwell time of 35 ms and a perpendicular trajectory to the target, Figure 3.12
was created to have a qualitative comparison between the cross-range resolutions of real
beam and DBS modes. Using [Hodgson & Lee, 2003, Farooq & Limebeer, 2007, Farooq
& N. Limebeer, 2002]:
∆CR =
λR0
2V Tdwell sin(θλ )
(3.70)
where R0 is the longitudinal range or ‘downrange’, V is the speed of the missile and
θλ is the angle between the platform velocity vector and target sightline. Eq. (3.70)
demonstrates that the cross-range resolution is dependent on the target range. Figure 3.11
was created by calculating the 3dB beamwidth from Eq. (3.68).
Figure 3.11: Real Cross-Range Resolution Figure 3.12: DBS Cross-Range Resolution
Figure 3.13 shows a real example of how DBS can improve the resolution of a real
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beam image, which will enable the seeker to resolve targets more effectively. The param-
eters of the radar used for the two images are not known, but the figure is helpful as a
qualitative example.
Figure 3.13: Comparison of Real Beam (left) Against DBS Image (right) [Kim et al.,
2011], c© [2011] IEEE
Many modern missile seekers use near millimetre wavelengths, which could have an
operating frequency of 15, 36.5 or 94 GHz. The higher frequencies enable the antenna
of a given size to have a narrower beamwidth and better cross-range resolution. The core









Where V is the missile velocity, θ f d is the angle between the Line of Sight (LOS) vec-
tor and velocity vector and λ is the wavelength of the carrier frequency. The Doppler
equation shows that if the missile speed and wavelength remain constant, changing the
direction of the missile will cause the Doppler shift to vary. Figure 3.15 shows this rela-
tionship at increasing multiples of Mach number. The Mach numbers are assumed to be
at International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) conditions, where Mach 1 is 340.29 m/s. It
can be seen in Figure 3.14 that the largest Doppler shift is observed when the missile is
heading directly towards the target. Figure 3.15 shows some typical boresight Doppler
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shifts with respect to Mach number.
Figure 3.14: Doppler Shift with Varying θ f d
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Figure 3.15: Doppler Shift for Increasing Missile Speed
Linear Frequency Modulation
DBS is a method to improve the cross-range resolution of the radar. It does not improve
the range resolution. For an unmodulated rectangular pulse, the range-resolution of the





where c is the speed of light and τ is the pulse width. Using this method results in a range
resolution of 150 m if τ is 1 µs long, which is not desirable. To improve the resolution,
shorter pulses could be transmitted. However, this would result in less energy being trans-
mitted for a given antenna transmitter power, which reduces the effective detection range
of the radar. Alternatively, a higher transmit power could be used to maintain the effective
range of the radar, whilst shortening the pulse. But this will likely require an unrealistic
peak transmitter power.
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A technique to improve the range-resolution of the radar is to use Linear Frequency Mod-
ulation (LFM) (also known as a ‘chirp’) to sweep the frequency of the waveform across a
































The larger the bandwidth, the better the range resolution. Using a bandwidth of 20 MHz





An example of a chirp waveform with a pulse width of 10 µs is shown in Figure 3.16 and
the frequency spectrum corresponding to a bandwidth, B, of 20 MHz is shown in Figure
3.17.
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Figure 3.16: LFM or Chirp Waveform Figure 3.17: Frequency Spectrum of LFM
Waveform
The range resolution from Eq. (3.76) can be observed in the output of the matched
filter. The matched filter from Section 3.2.3 can be realised by the cross-correlation func-
tion between a received signal sR(t) and the transmitted signal, sT (t). To demonstrate Eq.
(3.76) in an example, let
sT (t) = s(t)ei2π fct (3.77)
where fc is the carrier frequency of the waveform and s(t) is the same as Eq. (3.73). If
sT (t) is transmitted and delayed by an arbitrary time delay td , then after downmixing, the
received signal is
sR(t) = s(t− td)e−i2π fctd (3.78)
By cross-correlating the received signal sR(t) with s(t), the matched filter output is




s∗T (td− t)sR(td)dtd (3.79)
This will give a peak at the time lag where sR(td) matches s∗T (td− t). For ease of im-
plementation and speed, the cross-correlation between the transmitted and received pulses
can be found in the frequency domain. The convolution theorem states that convolution
in the time domain is equivalent to multiplication in the frequency domain [Haykin &
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s∗T ( f )sR( f )
]
ei2π f td f (3.80)
With a bandwidth of 20 MHz and a pulse width of 10 µs, Figure 3.18 shows the
cross-correlation of a single pulse for one target at a nominal range of 10000 m. The
figure demonstrates Eq. (3.76) as the width between the first nulls either side of the main
peak is 7.5m.
Figure 3.18: Range Profile of a Single Target for One Pulse
3.4.3 DBS Example
An example scenario for a missile using a DBS system is now detailed. The theory will
explain the scenario for a single waveform first and then give the theory for a pulsed DBS
system. The scenario uses four targets with two pairs at the same ranges, but separated
in cross-range. Figure 3.19 shows the geometry for this scenario and Table 3.1 shows the
actual target locations with respect to the missile.
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Table 3.1: Jamming Scenario One Target Locations





Figure 3.19: Scenario Geometry
Consider a missile seeker transmitting a signal
sT (t) = s(t)ei2π fct (3.81)
flying along the x-axis of a 2D Cartesian coordinate system with dynamics
x(t) =Vt (3.82)
and velocity V , where fc is the carrier frequency of the radar. The signal reflected
from a target located at a slant range R0 and cross range x0, as shown in Figure 3.19, can
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be expressed as










is the instantaneous target distance from the missile. Using algebraic manipulation, R(t)
can be redefined as
√



















































This is where DBS differs from SAR. With short dwell times (t ≈ 0), the higher order
terms can be neglected, which will result in only linear phase terms being included in the
DBS equation in Eq. 3.94. A first order taylor approximation of Eq. (3.88) can be taken,
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which results in √









Figure 3.20 shows that this approximation holds when the ratio of downrange (R0) to







Figure 3.20: Comparison of True Value Vs Binomial Expansion of (1+ y)
1
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Finally, the signal received by the seeker after IQ demodulation can be expressed as
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which after the narrowband approximation [Van Trees, 2001] becomes












where γR is the two-way attenuation factor. The received signal is a delayed copy of the
transmitted signal shifted in Doppler of fD = 2V x0λR0 . DBS measures the Doppler shift and
obtains an estimate of the slant range to find the cross-range coordinate of the target.
Following the geometry and notation for a single pulse, an example of pulsed DBS






where s(t) is the baseband signal, τ is the pulse width, m is the pulse number and PRI
is the Pulse Repetition Interval. For this example, s(t) is a Linear Frequency Modulated



























s(t− τ(t)−mPRI)ei2π fc(t−τ(t)) (3.98)
where m is the pulse number. Noise and clutter were considered to be negligible,
as it was assumed that there was a good Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). The scenario is
measured over one Coherent Processing Interval (CPI) of 128 pulses. The received signal
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sR(t) would normally be passed through a matched filter to get the range and maximise
the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). In this case however, the matched filter is simulated
by using the cross-correlation function, for ease of simplicity in the implementation in a
noiseless environment. The signal parameters used are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Signal Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 36 GHz
Bandwidth B 20 MHz
Pulse Width τ 20 µs
Chirp Rate γ 1×1012 Hz2
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 20 kHz
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50 µs
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Before taking the Fourier transform, the raw signal can be plotted against the pulse
number, to show the range profiles of the four targets which is shown in figure 3.21.
Figure 3.21: Range Profile of Targets
Figures 3.22 and 3.23 show the range and Doppler profiles for two of the four targets
respectively. These plots are slices across DBS image to show the range and Doppler
profiles of the targets.
Figure 3.22: Range Profile with Two Targets Figure 3.23: Doppler Profile of Two Targets
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Range Doppler Maps
After the matched filter, the range profiles are then Fourier transformed in the azimuth
direction to obtain a Range-Doppler matrix. This can then be plotted to create a Range-
Doppler map, which contains the range and Doppler profiles of the four targets. Figure
3.24 shows four targets at their respective ranges and Doppler Shifts.
Figure 3.24: Range Doppler Map
From Figure 3.11, a conventional radar would not have been able to resolve the targets
in cross-range, only in range (due to the bandwidth of the transmitted waveform), resulting
in the detection of only two targets. Whereas with DBS, all four figures can be resolved.
3.5 Conclusion
An overview of general radar equations, detection processes in White Gaussian Noise,
antennas and DBS has been presented in this chapter. The theory presented has been used
extensively throughout this thesis and the theory used for DBS will be built upon and
explored in the remaining chapters.
Chapter 4
Taking DBS Images with Hardware
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes how a system capable of obtaining DBS images was constructed,
tested, verified and subsequently implemented. A Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) was used for all images taken with hardware and the setup was later modified to
include jamming scenarios in future chapters. In short, the system comprises a belt driven
rail that uses a stepper motor, to move the antennas in a linear motion to create an aperture
and simulate a trajectory.
4.2 Overview of Experimental System
The rail is a 2 m belt driven rail, with a stepper motor driving the belt from one end of the
rail to the other (either direction) in a linear motion. See Figure 4.1 for an overview of
the rail. The microcontroller used to control the motor is an Arduino Uno (ATmega328P
chip) and a NEMA17 bi-polar stepper motor was used as the actuator. Implementing a
Direct Current (DC) motor without positional control can easily be done with just a resis-
tor, transistor and feedback diode, with the speed controlled by Pulse Width Modulation
(PWM). PWM varies the length of pulses of voltage supplied to the motor from the Ar-
duino. It is equivalent to rapidly switching the motor on and off, where if the PWM duty
66
CHAPTER 4. TAKING DBS IMAGES WITH HARDWARE 67
cycle is 100%, the motor is continuously running and at its maximum speed for the given
load upon it. Stepper motors were favoured against a conventional DC motor, as although
they are much slower compared to a DC motor, the position of stepper motors can be ac-
curately controlled (without the need for rotary encoders) to a given step angle. They also
generally provide higher torque (at the expense of speed), which was required to move
the antennas, which weighed approximately 1.1 kg.
Figure 4.1: Constructed DBS Rail
4.2.1 Controlling Circuit
National Instrument’s LabVIEW software controlled the Universal Software Radio Pe-
ripheral (USRP) and sent the required movement distance strings to the Arduino, via Se-
rial connections. Arduino used a serial connection to receive the required distance from
LabVIEW and then the software written for the Arduino (c++) would enable the motor
to move the antenna by the desired distance. This was on a pulse-per-pulse basis. This
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meant LabView would send a string to the Arduino every time it required it to move a
single increment between transmitted/received pulses.
The motor used was a ‘NEMA 17’ 0.9◦ (400 steps per 360◦ revolution) bi-polar stepper
motor. The breakout board used to interface the Arduino to the stepper motor was an
A4988 ‘StepStick’ driver board. The board has an on board translator, which means that
one pulse from the Arduino gives a one step rotation in the motor and it varies the voltage
to supply a constant current to the motor for each pulse.
The Arduino outputs the direction of the rotation, the step PWM and the power supply
for the A4988 driver. An external 12 V power supply is connected to the A4988 driver,
which the motor draws its power from. See Figure 4.2 for a full circuit diagram, which
was created using ‘Fritzing’ software.
Figure 4.2: Circuit Schematic
4.2.2 Calibration of Antenna Movement
One of the key aspects of this test was to verify the precision and accuracy of the rail.
Several approaches were explored. One method was to use a Vector Network Analyser
(VNA), which is generally considered to be an accurate device for taking measurements.
The VNA would take a measurement of a target and compare the expected phase dif-
ferences between the pulses with the actual data. This method was however dismissed,
because the verification of the rail should be independent of the signals generating device
(e.g. a Software Defined Radio (SDR) or VNA), to help with potential fault finding in
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more complicated data. It is easier to understand erroneous data if the source of the error
can be independently isolated. The movable platform (in this case the rail), is a com-
pletely different type of system to the measurement system (in this case a VNA or SDR).
Therefore, the two systems should not be used to calibrate each other, in order to avoid
coupling of errors.
Another approach to verifying the rail accuracy was to use a laser range finder and mea-
sure the distance moved, relative to the walls of the laboratory, see Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Set up for Displacement Verification With Laser
The problem with this method is that it assumes that the wall is perfectly straight and
with no perturbations in its surface. A visual inspection of the wall revealed that this
assumption was not fully valid. Whilst it is likely that errors induced by the pertubations
would have been small (potentially less than the 1 cm resolution of the laser range finder),
another method was available. The final approach was to clamp a Vernier caliper to the
rail and use the antenna movement to displace the caliper, by the distance the antenna was
supposed to move by. The caliper has a resolution of 1 micron which is suitable for the
measurements used in calibration. See Figure 4.4 for a visual explanation.
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Figure 4.4: Set up for Displacement Verification
The advantage of using the clamped caliper over the laser range finder meant it was
easier to repeat the measurements to the same standard as the measurements were inde-
pendent of the room and rail orientation. The digital reading was recorded and then reset
to zero for each step. The “NEMA 17” motor has a step of 0.9◦ (400 steps per 360◦ revo-
lution). With the drive gear (as shown in the top-left image of Figure 4.1) being 18.57 mm
in diameter (measured with the vernier caliper), one full revolution results in a horizontal
displacement of 58.34 mm. In turn, one 0.9◦ step, results in a minimum displacement of
0.146 mm. This rounds to approximately 0.15 mm, which means that if a mm integer
displacement distance is required, the integer 3 must be a factor of the displacement dis-
tance. To measure the accuracy of the rail, a total of 180 steps of 3.06 mm were used.
The measurements were taken in blocks of 30 pulses at 3 locations on the rail, for both
clockwise and anti-clockwise stepper motor movements, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Points Along Rail Where Calibration Started
In Appendix A, Figure A.1 gives the travelled distance for each pulse measured and
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shows 6 batches of 30 pulses. Figure 4.5 shows the points where the batches started from.
Batches 1-3 for clockwise stepper motor rotation, were taken in the direction of A to B at
the corresponding measurements shown in the Figure 4.5. Batches 4-6 from Figure A.1
used the same measurements in Figure 4.5, but instead ran from point B to A with the
stepper motor rotating in an anti-clockwise direction (for an observer facing the rail with
point B to the right of point A).
Due to the construction of the rail, the final 150 mm at either end is not a usable part,
hence the measurements started and finished at measurements corresponding to those
values. The yellow and black stripes in Figure 4.5 indicate these unusable areas. The
results from the measurements are shown in Table 4.1.
Batch Mean Error Standard Deviation Average Deviation
1 3.08 0.02 0.12 0.10
2 3.12 0.06 0.13 0.08
3 3.07 0.01 0.15 0.12
4 3.08 0.02 0.14 0.11
5 3.10 0.04 0.10 0.08
6 3.05 -0.01 0.14 0.11
Total A to B 3.09 0.03 0.13 0.10
Total B to A 3.08 0.02 0.13 0.10
Total 3.08 0.02 0.13 0.10
Table 4.1: Rail Calibration Statistics (in mm) With 3.06 mm Intended Movement
Distance
The experimental results for this thesis were obtained with a transmission frequency
of 5 GHz and a wavelength of 6 cm. The reasons for using 5 GHz will be detailed in
the next section. The mean of the total number of measured step distances has an error
of 0.02 mm, which when using a wavelength of 6 cm, is an error of 0.03% and therefore
not significant enough to affect the measurement result. Table 4.1 shows a consistent
accuracy of step increment. This demonstrates that the system can be operated anywhere
along the usable parts of the rail and in either direction.
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4.3 Taking DBS Images with a USRP
Once the precision and accuracy of the rail was verified, a DBS image of a flat plate was
taken. Other types of target could have been used for the measurements, such as a sphere
or corner reflector. A spherical target has a Radar Cross Section (RCS) which is indepen-
dent of aspect angle [Skolnik, 2008], but a small RCS when compared to a flat plate or
corner reflector of a similar physical size.
A flat plate has the highest RCS out of the three types of target, when illuminated with
zero aspect angle (i.e. head on). However, the RCS of a flat plate degrades rapidly to
almost zero when aspect angles are introduced. The drop in RCS due to changing the
aspect angle could also result in a poorer cross-range resolution (than calculated) of the
target being imaged. This is due to the lack of detectable returns from the target and a
subsequent shorter dwell time on the target.
The RCS of a corner reflector when illuminated with zero aspect angle is comparable to a
flat plate, but generally not as high. However, a corner reflector has better coverage across
a greater range of aspect angles. For the measurements taken, either a flat plate or corner
reflector could have been used. Due to the geometries of the measurements and short
movement of the antennas along the rail (less than 40 cm), the change in aspect angles
will be small. Therefore, a flat plate target was chosen, to give the largest RCS.
A Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) was used to take the measurements. A
USRP is a type of software defined radio, which can be used for prototyping communi-
cation systems, radars, radios, etc. The USRP used for the measurements is the National
Instruments (NI) USRP 2943R, which has a frequency range of 1.2-6 GHz. The frequency
used for the experimental results in this thesis is 5 GHz. The reason for this is that it was
desired to have as narrow a beamwidth as possible, for a given antenna size. However,
it was decided not to use 6 GHz to avoid hitting the limits of the USRP which may have
caused problems with the results. Therefore, 5 GHz was chosen as a compromise of using
the highest frequency available, whilst staying well clear of the limits of the USRP. The
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USRP has an instantaneous bandwidth of 40 MHz, as shown in Table 4.2. This means that
the smallest range resolution possible would be 3.75 m. Whilst it would be desirable to
have a better range resolution, the parameter of interest is cross-range resolution, which
for DBS is dependant on the dwell time and not on the bandwidth.
Parameter Value
Operating Frequency 1.2−6 GHz
Instantaneous Bandwidth 40 MHz
Max Output Power (3.5 - 6 GHz) 5 mW to 32 mW
Max. Sampling Rate 200 MHz
Number of Channels 4 (2 × Tx/Rx)
Table 4.2: NI USRP 2943R Specifications
The movement of the antennas was carried out in steps and was used to simulate the
linear motion of a missile to test the developed theory. To reduce the complexity of the
measurements, a ‘stop and go’ method was used between pulses, instead of continuously
moving the antenna and transmitting. Using this method removed the requirement for
instantaneous processing of the transmitted and received waveforms as well as remov-
ing the requirement to move the antenna at high speeds. The ‘stop and go’ method also
enabled the simulation of higher velocities than the rail was physically capable of or dif-
ferent PRIs as the antenna can be moved according to the distance the seeker would travel
between PRIs. For example, if the PRF is 10 kHz and the missile speed 300 m/s, the
antenna can be moved 3 cm between each transmitted pulse. Therefore by controlling the
distance moved by the antenna between pulses and assuming a fixed PRF, the speed can
be simulated as the Doppler shifts are not observed in fast time, but in slow time between
pulses.
One constraint of using this method is that the imaged scene must be stationary during the
imaging period. This is due to the real time between pulses being in the order of several
seconds (it takes time to move the antenna the desired distance between pulses).
All measurements were completed in the far-field region of the antennas. The far-field
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of an antenna can be calculated by[Balanis, 2015]:




With a horn antenna that is ≈ 90 mm at the flared end and with an operating frequency
of 5 GHz or 6 cm wavelength, the far-field is at a distance greater than 0.27 m from the
antenna. The target was placed at a range of 4 m from the antenna, so was well into this
region. The far-field region was used because the radiation pattern does not change with







= 34.0◦ or0.59rad (4.2)
where W is the width of the antenna at the flared end. This means that at a range of 4 m,





and therefore ≈ 2.34 m.
CHAPTER 4. TAKING DBS IMAGES WITH HARDWARE 75
4.3.1 USRP Image of a Single Target
Before jamming, a DBS image of a flat plate was taken to prove that an image could be
taken with a USRP. Table 4.3 shows the parameters used for the experiment.
The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of the Rectangular plate used in the experiments assumes





where A is the area of the target and λ is the wavelength. The rectangular plate used had
dimensions 0.3 m × 0.3 m × 0.002 m, which gives an area of 0.09 m2.
Parameter Symbol Value
Flat Plate RCS σ 28.27 m2
Frequency fc 5 GHz
BandWidth B 30 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Chirp Rate γ 3×1012 Hz2
Sample Rate Fs 80 MHz
Number of Pulses M 128
Downrange RD 3.64 m
Crossrange Rcr 1.3 m
Step Distance ∆x 2 mm
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50 µs
Inferred Velocity V 40 m/s
Table 4.3: DBS Image Parameters
Figure 4.6 gives the schematic for the measurement. The antenna was moved towards
the rectangular plate and a chirp waveform was transmitted.
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Figure 4.6: Schematic of DBS System



























Figures 4.7 and 4.9 show the transmitted and received waveforms for a single step, as
well as their corresponding frequency spectrums, which demonstrate a bandwidth of 30
MHz was used.
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Figure 4.7: Transmitted and Received Signal from Target
Figure 4.8: FFT of Transmitted Signal Figure 4.9: FFT of Received Signal
Figure 4.11 shows the range and cross-range profiles of the target. To factor in the
length of the cables (' 1.3 m each), the two cables were connected together and a sin-
gle pulse (identical to the transmitted pulses for each experiment) was transmitted and
received through the cables. This single pulse was then stored and used to correlate the
received pulses to create the DBS images in this thesis. The null-to-null width of the main
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lobe of the range profile is 10 m wide and the 3dB width is 5 m which is expected when






which will give a cross-range resolution [Hodgson & Lee, 2003, Farooq &
Limebeer, 2007, Farooq & N. Limebeer, 2002] of
∆CR =
λR0




= 0.46 m (4.7)








The null-to-null width of the main peak for the cross-range profile is approximately 1m,
giving a 3dB width of approximately 0.5 m, which agrees with Eq. (4.7).
Figure 4.10: Range Profile of Target Figure 4.11: Cross-rangeProfile of Target
The range profile for all of the pulses is shown in Figure 4.12. The figure shows a
constant range profile for the target.
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Figure 4.12: Output of Matched Filter
Figure 4.13 shows the range-Doppler map for the target and the DBS image for the




= 476.19 Hz (4.8)
and the Doppler shown in the figure demonstrates this expected value.
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Figure 4.13: Range-Doppler Map
of Imaged Target
Figure 4.14: DBS Image of
Imaged Target
4.3.2 Demonstrating DBS with Two Targets
The benefit of using DBS, is to increase cross range resolution and to resolve targets which
are closer in cross-range, than the resolution of the real beam of the radar. Therefore, a
second measurement was taken to show how DBS can resolve two targets in cross-range,
which are closer than the cross-range resolution that the real beam can resolve. There
are two measurements, one completely stationary, which should show one target at zero
Doppler and the correct range and a second DBS image, showing how two targets were
resolved by performing DBS. Both sets of images are taken using the signal parameters
shown in Table 4.4.
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Parameter Symbol Value
Flat Plate RCS σ 28.27 m2
Frequency fc 5 GHz
BandWidth B 30 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Chirp Rate γ 3×1012 Hz2
Sample Rate Fs 80 MHz
Number of Pulses Np 128
Downrange RD 4 m
Cross-range Rcr 0.5 m and 1.8 m
Step Distance ∆x 2 mm
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50 µs
Inferred Velocity V 40 m/s
Table 4.4: DBS Image Parameters
The geometry for both sets of images is shown in Figure 4.15. The layout and setup
is very similar to the previous scenario with just a single target, but now with two targets
and slightly different cross-range positions.
Figure 4.15: Schematic for Two Targets Separated by 1.3 m
CHAPTER 4. TAKING DBS IMAGES WITH HARDWARE 82
Stationary Measurement of Two Targets
The purpose of conducting a stationary measurement is to demonstrate that the theory of
DBS presented in Chapter 3 is correct. The theory says DBS requires a changing Doppler
shift caused by either platform or target motion across the real-beam to increase cross-
range resolution. When stationary, the DBS image will show one target at 0 Hz Doppler
and a target at 4 m in range, as shown in Figures 4.18 and 4.19. The cross-range resolution
was approximately 2.34 m as previously calculated, so the real beam could not resolve
the two targets without using DBS.
Figure 4.16 shows constant range profiles at approximately 4.5 m. The purpose of this
figure is to show that the range was constant across each pulse of the measurement.
Figure 4.16: Matched Filter Output
Figure 4.18 shows a single target at a specific range and at zero Doppler/cross-range.
This is to be expected without any antenna movement, and shows that the targets could not
be resolved. The range resolution should again be 5 m and from Eq. (4.7),the cross-range
resolution should be approximately 0.5 m which the plot labels show.
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Figure 4.17: Range Profile of Targets Figure 4.18: Doppler Profile of Targets
Figure 4.19 shows that due to the lack of movement of the antenna, DBS cannot be
performed as there was no changing Doppler shifts during the measurement. It shows a
single target (as opposed to two) at zero Doppler and a range of approximately 4.5 m,
which was expected.
Figure 4.19: DBS Image of Two Targets When Stationary
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DBS Image with Rail
The second part of the two-part measurement was to use the same layout as shown in
Figure 4.15, but incorporating antenna movement to create a DBS image and resolve the
two rectangular plates. Figure 4.20 shows the range profile for the two targets which are at
the same range. There is a single profile at a range of approximately 4 m. The null-to-null
width of the main peak is approximately 10 m, giving the 3dB range resolution of 5 m,
which is expected when a bandwidth of 30 MHz is used.
Figure 4.20: Range Profile of Target
The range profiles for all of the pulses is shown in Figure 4.21. Whilst the range pro-
files are constant, there is a noticeable power difference across the pulses, this is thought
to be due to the incidence of the flat plates changing as the antenna moves along the rail
and interference between the echoes from the two plates because the relative distance
changes at each step.
Figure 4.23 shows the cross-range profiles of two targets at the corresponding cross-
ranges, demonstrating that the two targets could be resolved using DBS. The two plots
show the positions of the targets in cross-range at the correct location (corresponding to
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Figure 4.21: Matched Filter Output
Figure 4.15). The second plot shows the null-to-null width of the main peak is approxi-
mately 1 m, giving a 3dB cross-range resolution of approximately 0.5 m.
Figure 4.22: Doppler Profile of Targets Figure 4.23: Cross-Range Profile of Targets
Figure 4.24 shows two targets at the respective cross-ranges and range profile. How-
ever, the figure also has a noticeable ‘target’ to the left of the two imaged plates at ap-
proximately 0 Hz and 0 m in cross-range. It is thought that this is caused by background
objects in the scene (caused by immovable pipework in the laboratory and no radar ab-
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sorbent material was available). Figure 4.23 shows a reasonably constant range profile but
between pulses 60 and 130 there are weaker reflections at a range of approximately 10 m,
which would correspond with these objects. The overall result however, demonstrates the
principle of DBS. Creating an aperture and a changing Doppler shift causes a synthetic
narrowing of the real beam and results in an improved cross-range resolution. This leads
to targets being resolved in cross-range which the real-beam radar would not have been
resolve.
Figure 4.24: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of Two Targets
4.4 Conclusion
This Chapter has detailed the experimental setup used throughout the thesis and how DBS
images were taken with a linear, belt-driven rail. The setup does have some limitations
such as the exact horizontal distances being limited by a step resolution of 0.146 mm per
step. However, this is overcome by factoring step resolution into the measurements. The
results in this chapter demonstrate the effectiveness of the system to take DBS images.
The DBS images of the flat plate show DBS theory in action and prove that DBS can
resolve targets where a real beam cannot, by creating an aperture across the target being
imaged. The setup and measurements have been built upon in the remaining chapters and
used to test the jamming theory that this thesis develops.
Chapter 5
Generating False Targets Against DBS
Modes
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents two implementation methods of creating a false target in a DBS
image and is one of the main novel and original contributions of this thesis. Both methods
assume the jammer has the ability to create high fidelity copies of the seeker waveform,
using Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM). Both methods aim to create the same
result of a false target in a specific location, but create the target in different ways.
The first implementation method repeats the seeker waveform with an incremental delay
between pulses to create the desired time delay history of the false target. The jamming
theory is developed for this method and tested with simulations in Matlab. The second
implementation method uses a constant delay and applied Doppler shift to create the
false target and is considered to be the easiest of the two to practically implement against
narrowband signals. Whilst both methods are tested with simulations, only the second
method is tested with practical experiments, due to it being more feasible to implement in
practice than the first method.
The developed theory and experimental results show that false targets can be placed at
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desired locations within the seeker DBS image, providing that the jammer has knowledge
of the trajectory of the seeker and the ability to reproduce the waveforms of the seeker.
5.2 General Geometry and Signal Model
It was proved in Chapter 3 that there must be an offset angle between the platform and
the target to perform DBS. The scenario in this chapter therefore studies an anti-ship
missile, flying at an offset angle to the target. DBS is often used in an area search mode
and there are different search modes it can use to acquire targets. The modes are not
discussed or detailed in this thesis, but it is assumed that the seeker is using a ‘spotlight’
search mode. Spotlight is used in SAR and is essentially steering the illuminating pattern
(either mechanically or electronically), to image a constant target area over the Coherent
Processing Interval (CPI) [Stimson et al., 2014]. Therefore, it is assumed that the jammer
is at the centre of the target area and is illuminated for the entire CPI, for each scenario
presented in this thesis.
The geometry and signal model is now presented. Consider a missile seeker, transmitting
a signal
sT (t) = s(t)ei2π fct (5.1)
whilst flying along the x-axis of a 2D Cartesian coordinate system with dynamics
x(t) =Vt (5.2)
and constant velocity V , as shown in Figure 5.1, where s(t) is an arbitrary complex enve-
lope of the waveform and fc is the carrier frequency.
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Figure 5.1: Missile Reference Frame
The signal reflected from a target located at a slant range R0 and cross range x0, can
be expressed as










is the instantaneous target distance from the missile. Using algebraic manipulation, R(t)
can be redefined as
√
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Finally, the signal received by the seeker after IQ demodulation can be expressed as







which after the narrowband approximation [Van Trees, 2001] becomes












where γR is the two-way attenuation factor. The received signal is a delayed copy of the
transmitted signal shifted in Doppler of fD = 2V x0λR0 . DBS measures the Doppler shift and
obtains an estimate of the slant range to find the cross-range coordinate of the target.
5.3 Jamming Theory and Method
This section presents two implementation methods of creating a false target in a DBS
image. The first is by adding an incremental time delay to the waveform and the second
is a delay and Doppler shift to create the false target.
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5.3.1 Varying Time Delay Method
This sub-section details how to create false targets by using a repeat jamming method
with a time-varying delay. As shown in Figure 5.2, the propagation distance, R(t), is time
varying due to the movement of the missile. This means that the time delay for an echo
reflection will also change with time due to the movement of the missile. The changing
delay is what creates the time varying Doppler shift that enables DBS to be used.
Figure 5.2: Missile Reference Frame With Jammer
The presented theory shows how a jammer can create the time-delay history for a
false target. This is done by repeating the seeker waveform but with an incremental delay,
τ j(t). This is to mimic the delay a false target would have, if it was located at the location
the jammer is trying to represent. A schematic of the jamming scheme is shown in Figure
5.3
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Figure 5.3: Jamming Block Diagram
From Eq. (5.12) , an ideal target located at (x0 +δx, R0 +δR) would generate an echo
signal





















− 2V (x0 +δx)t
c(R0 +δR)
(5.14)
This means that the value of τ j(t) must be such that when applied to the seeker wave-
form, the seeker receives the signal in Eq. (5.13). Using Eq. (5.12) and Eq. (5.13), an
expression for τ j(t) can be defined as






































From the scenario in Figure 5.2, let the transmitted signal sT (t) from the seeker be
the same as Eq. (5.1), where s(t) is an arbitrary complex envelope of the waveform.
Following the geometry of Figure 5.2, whilst propagating towards the jammer, sT (t) will
experience a time delay corresponding to the distance R(t). From Eq. (3.92), the delay

















Showing full workings, τ(t) can be expressed as
cτ(t) = R0 +β t−βτ(t) (5.21)

















where γ is a one-way attenuation factor. The jammer would then delay jR(t) by τ j(t), to
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give an additive range component and induce a Doppler shift to then transmit









where γJ is the jammer gain factor. The second leg of propagation back towards the seeker












giving the resultant jamming signal received by the seeker as









The term c(c+β )(t− τ
′(t)) can be simplified to
c
(c+β )















From Eq. (5.17), expanding τ j(t− τ ′(t)) gives






































When R0 > x0, the terms with the denominator of c2 can be approximated to zero. There-
fore,




δR +β jt−β t
]
(5.31)
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This gives the received jamming signal as















After replacing the expression of sT (t), the signal received at the seeker can be expressed
as































which after down-conversion becomes





































c+β ' 1 and after the narrowband
approximation [Van Trees, 2001] the final waveform at the seeker becomes













where all constant phase terms have been included in the parameter γ̂R .
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False Target Simulation
The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate how to perfectly place a false target in
the desired location, assuming all required parameters are known. In practice, incorrect
estimations of the seeker waveforms or inaccuracies in the trajectory or velocity of the
missile, will lead to the false target not being exactly where the jammer intends to insert
it. This issue is the main topic of Chapter 6 and will be presented and discussed there.
The simulation was undertaken using the geometry of Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1. The miss
distances chosen would be dependant on the scenario and dynamics of the battlespace, but
were nominally 200m in downrange an 300m in cross-range for this particular scenario.
Table 5.1: Example Scenario Variables
Variable Seeker False Target Miss Distance
Down-range (km) 14 (R0) 14.2 (R0 +δR) 0.2 (δR)
Cross-range (km) 0.5 (x0) 0.8 (x0 +δx) 0.3 (δx)
For the scenarios in this section, a pulsed Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM) wave-




























The waveform was constructed with the notation of negative time to maintain the
centre frequency of the chirp at the carrier frequency of the radar. Table 5.2 shows the
signal parameters used for the scenario.
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Table 5.2: Simulation Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Missile Velocity V 270 m/s
Carrier Frequency fc 36 GHz
Bandwidth B 40 MHz
Pulse Width τ 3 µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 10 kHz
Number of Pulses M 64
Dwell Time td 6.4 ms
Doppler Resolution δ f 156.25 Hz
The values of Table 5.2 were chosen to best represent the seeker threat, obtained
from unclassified literature. The operating frequency of 36 GHz is within the North At-
lantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) K band. The frequency of 36 GHz is often used by
seekers as it enables smaller beamwidths than using lower frequencies. As a general pur-
pose rule, the higher the frequency, the narrower the beamwidth. There is a trade-off
between beamwidth and frequency however, as the higher the frequency, the higher the
atmospheric attenuation, generally. This means that to maintain the same detection range,
more power (than the seeker could potentially generate) is generally required as frequency
increases. There are peaks and troughs along this trend though and 36 GHz falls into a
lull in atmospheric attenuation.
The waveforms and frequency spectrums for the scenario are shown in Figures 5.4 and
5.5. The figures show LFM pulses with a pulse width of 3 µs and a bandwidth of 40 MHz.
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Figure 5.4: Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.5: Frequency Spectrum of Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Using the method described in the previous section and parameters in Tables 5.1 and
5.2, a false target could be placed at a desired location in the DBS image from the seeker.
Figure 5.6 shows the range and cross-range profiles for the false target. With a bandwidth
of 40 MHz, the null-to-null width of the main lobe should be 7.5 m to give a 3 dB range-
resolution of 3.75 m, which the plot labels show. From Table 5.2, the Doppler resolution
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is 156.25 Hz. With the geometry in Figure 5.2 and values in Table 5.1, the cross-range
resolution [Hodgson & Lee, 2003, Farooq & Limebeer, 2007, Farooq & N. Limebeer,
2002] at the jammer position is
∆CR =
λR0




= 33.64 m (5.39)
which is demonstrated in the cross-range profile in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Range and Doppler Slices of False Target
Figure 5.7 shows the range-Doppler map and DBS image for the scenario. For this




= 3665.37 Hz (5.40)
which the range-Doppler map shows. The DBS image shows the echo and false targets at
the correct position of 14.2 km in range, 0.8 km in cross-range.
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Figure 5.7: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of Scenario
For the geometry in Table 5.1, the time-varying delay time of the jammer, calculated
by Eq. (5.17), is shown in Figure 5.8. For a typical scenario with the geometry in Table
5.1, it can be seen that the largest component of the equation is the constant δRc and the
time-varying components will be small, in the order of picoseconds as shown in Figure
5.9. For example, the difference between the time delay for each pulse in this scenario is
2.3 picoseconds. It is these slight changes which are critical to create the changing phase,
to create the false target in the DBS image. However, such precise timings are difficult to
achieve in practice.
Figure 5.8: Total Jammer Hold On Time for
Each Pulse
Figure 5.9: Difference of Jammer Hold On
Time Relative To First Pulse
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Changing the Shape of the Target
This scenario is similar to the first jamming scenario, except that there are multiple scat-
terers in the scene and the false target (denoted by ‘FT’) is placed between targets ‘T2’
and ‘T3’ in cross-range. Figure 5.10 shows the layout of this principle. For this scenario,
it is assumed that the jammer is located at ‘T1’ with the co-ordinates (x0, R0). If the
targets are placed close enough to each other that they can only just be resolved at their
respective ranges, placing a target between them in cross range would mask the fact that
there are two targets and instead create one larger target. The simulation is a simplified
example, but the purpose of it is to show that the jammer can be used to change features
of an existing target by placing a false target in exactly the correct place.
Figure 5.10: Missile Reference Frame With Jammer
Table 5.3 shows the location of the targets with the geometry of the scenario being
almost the same as the first jamming scenario. From the Doppler resolution listed in
Table 5.2 and by using Eq. (5.39), the cross-range resolution is 33.64 m. Therefore, by
placing a false target with spacing less than the cross-range resolution, the targets will not
be able to be resolve and will form into single, larger target.
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Table 5.3: Jamming Scenario Two Target Locations
Target R0 (m) x0 (m)
1 14000 500
2 14010 500
False Target 14010 517
3 14010 534
4 14000 534
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the transmitted and received waveform with a pulse width
of 3 µs as well as a bandwidth of 40 MHz.
Figure 5.11: Transmitted and Received Waveforms
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Figure 5.12: Frequency Spectrum of Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the results of the simulation. Targets Two and Three can-
not be resolved using the existing DBS method. The purpose of this simulation is to show
that if the surrounding geometry of targets, CPI of the seeker and trajectory of the seeker is
known, the jammer could attempt to change the shape of existing targets, to make smaller
targets appear larger in size and possibly more desirable to the seeker.
The range profile in Figure 5.13 shows two profiles in range, which is expected as the
targets were separated by a distance greater than the range resolution of 3.75 m. With a
cross-range resolution of 33.64 m, the cross-range profile in Figure 5.13 shows only one,
large target as the target was placed in such a way that it could not be resolved between
the surrounding echoes.
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Figure 5.13: Range and Doppler Slices of False Target
The final result in Figure 5.14 shows only three targets, two echoes and one large target
caused by the jammer accurately placing a false target so that it could not be resolved
between surrounding echoes.
Figure 5.14: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of Scenario
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5.3.2 Delay and Modification
In this sub-section, the jamming scheme outlined in Figure 5.15 is proposed to enable the
jammer to generate false targets, by applying a constant time delay τ j and a Doppler shift
fJ = α fD to the intercepted waveform. The goal of the jammer is to calculate τ j and the
parameter α , based on the received signal, to place the false target at the desired miss-
distance in downrange and cross-range. This is the second of the two implementation
methods presented in this chapter. This method is thought to be easier to be implemented
in practice as it does not require such precise timings, due to the constant time delay used.
Figure 5.15: Jamming Block Diagram
Let the transmitted signal sT (t) from the seeker be the same as Eq. (5.1) where s(t) is
an arbitrary complex envelope of the waveform. Whilst propagating towards the jammer,
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where γ is the one-way attenutation factor. The jammer would then delay jR(t) by τ j, to
give an additive range component, and induce a Doppler shift to then transmit








× exp(i2π fcαt) (5.44)
where γJ is the jammer gain factor. The second leg of propagation back towards the seeker












This gives the resulting jamming signal to be









i2π fcα[t− τ ′(t]
) (5.46)
which, after replacing the value of τ ′(t) in Eq. (5.45), can be written as






















After replacing the expression of sT (t), the signal received at the seeker can be expressed
as
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which after down-conversion becomes
















































c ' 1 and after the narrowband
approximation [Van Trees, 2001], the final waveform at the seeker becomes















where all constant phase terms have been included in the parameter γ̂R . From Eq. (5.12),
an ideal target located at (x0 +δx, R0 +δR) would generate an echo signal

















In order for the jammer to create the perfect false target, the value of τ j and α must be
such that the total time delay and Doppler shift at the seeker in Eq. (5.50) are the same as
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These results show that in order to generate a false target in the desired cross-range
location, the jammer ideally needs perfect knowledge of its position with respect to the
seeker.
Pulsed DBS






consisting of M pulses of duration τ . Following the result obtained in Eq. (5.50) and by




















where PRI is the Pulse Repetition Interval. When the time domain is sampled in a fast-
time, slow-time form with t = t1+ kPRI and 0 < t1 < PRI, the received signal becomes


























× exp(i2π fcαt1)exp(i2π fcαkPRI)
(5.58)
For a fixed range bin, the phase terms containing t1 will be constant across each pulse.
This therefore means they can be placed into the term γ̂R , which contains the other con-
stant phase terms. When k−m = 0 and when the pulse width, τ , is less than the PRI (τ <
PRI), the received pulse train at the seeker is
















Table 5.4 gives the seeker position variables and the additional false target positions
for an example scenario.
Table 5.4: Example Scenario Variables
Variable Seeker False Target Miss Distance
Down-range (km) 14 14.2 0.2
Cross-range (km) 0.5 0.8 0.3




is the phase component, which will give the Doppler history. This
therefore determines the cross-range position of the false target. This approximation holds
providing that there is no range migration during a CPI.
Using Eq. (5.59), positions in Table 5.4 and the signal variables in Table 5.5, a simulation
was used to demonstrate that a false target at a different cross-range position to the jammer
can be induced into the seeker DBS image. This is achieved by incrementally applying a
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phase shift to the received seeker waveform.
Table 5.5: Simulation Waveform Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 36 GHz
Bandwidth B 40 MHz
Pulse Width τ 3 µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 10 kHz
Figure 5.16 shows a chirp pulse of 3 µs duration and 5.17 shows the bandwidth of the
chirp to be 40 MHz.
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Figure 5.16: Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.17: Frequency Spectrum of Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.18 shows a clean range and Doppler profile of the false target to be at 14.2 km
in range and 0.8 km in cross-range, as intended. The range and cross-range resolutions
are the same as the previous scenarios (3.75 m and 33.64 m respectively).
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Figure 5.18: Range and Doppler Slices of False Target
The range-Doppler map and DBS image for the scenario is shown in Figure 5.19 and
two targets (jammer and false target) can be clearly seen at the correct locations. Likewise
with the previous section with the varying time delay method, the expected Doppler shift
for the false target is 3665.37 Hz which is shown in the range-Doppler map in Figure
5.19. The DBS image shows the echo and false targets at the correct position of 14.2 km
in range, 0.8 km in cross-range.
Figure 5.19: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of Scenario
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5.3.3 Constant Delay Only
Eq. (5.59) from the previous section shows that if the jammer uses the previous scheme
(depicted in Figure 5.15, but without a modification), a false target can be created at the
same cross-range/Doppler position but at an increased range . If α is set to zero, but τ j is
set to the desired additive range, the result at the seeker is














which shows the jammer can use the movement of the seeker to at least create the target at
the same Doppler and cross-range, but at a different range. Figures 5.20 and 5.21 show the
result of this method and that the position of the false target will be at the same position
of the jammer, but at an additive range.
Figure 5.20: Range and Doppler Slices of False Target
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Figure 5.21: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of Scenario
This method is primitive, but could be used if the jammer only has the ability to
repeat seeker waveforms. The jammer could continuously repeat the seeker waveform,
to essentially fill each range bin corresponding to the Doppler position of the jammer. It
would then change into a form of denial jamming. by denying the seeker the ability to
determine the range position of the jammer.
5.3.4 Evaluation of Methods
Two implementation methods of creating false targets against DBS seekers have been pre-
sented. Theoretically, both are equivalent in terms of generating a false target at the correct
location. The problem with both methods is that the jammer requires perfect knowledge
of the seeker location, in order to place a false target at the desired location in the seeker
image. The issue with the ‘Varying Time Delay’ method, is that the incremental delay
between pulses for a general scenario is in the order of picoseconds, as shown in Figure
5.9. In practice, such precise timings are difficult to achieve. A more viable solution is
to use the second scheme; a constant delay, and incremental Doppler shift to the seeker
waveform. It is for this reason that the experimental sections of this chapter focus on the
second implementation method.
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5.4 Testing Jamming Scheme Without Antenna Motion
Using the techniques in the previous sections with a Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP), a false target was induced into an image at a desired cross-range position of 3m.
With the experiment using the USRP, there was no real movement of the antennas, only a
constant delay caused by the separation of the two antennas. The aim of this experiment
was to show that a waveform could be modified to induce a target at a desired location.
It was the first stage of the experiments in this chapter, to give an initial demonstration of
the derived theory.
A target at 3 m cross-range was induced by applying an incremental shift to each trans-
mitted pulse by using an assumed missile velocity. This experiment was carried out using
a Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM) waveform, as per the simulated scenario in Figure
5.19. The variables used in the measurement are shown in Table 5.6 and the USRP used
was a National Instruments NI 2943R. The USRP was controlled using LabVIEW and
embedded Matlab software designed the waveforms used. No additional miss distance
in downrange was added in this experiment, so the quantity δR is zero. As there was no
real movement of the antennas, the quantity β was also zero. Therefore, the transmitted















i2π fcα(t1 + kPRI)
) (5.61)






























Following the same notation as the previous section and when k−m = 0, the received












As there was only one way propagation and no movement of the antenna, the term β was
not included in the equations.
Table 5.6: USRP Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 4 GHz
Bandwidth B 40 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Sampling Rate Fs 80 MHz
Assumed Missile Velocity V 100 m/s
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50 µs
Number of Pulses M 128
Figure 5.22 shows the set-up in the laboratory with two vivaldi antennas mounted on
tripods, connected to the USRP with standard RF cables.
Figure 5.23 shows the range and cross-range profiles of the false target and demon-
strate the additive cross-range position of 3 m in cross-range.
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Figure 5.22: USRP Set-Up
Figure 5.23: Range and Doppler Profile of False Target
Figure 5.24 shows the DBS image of this scenario with a clean target at 6m in range
and 3m in cross-range. These figures demonstrate that a false target can be generated at
the desired location within a DBS image, providing that the seeker trajectory is known
and the carrier frequency and waveform have been estimated correctly.
These measurements were performed for a completely known/assumed trajectory and
the next step is to change the experimental set-up to incorporate real movement of the
antennas, in accordance with the movement of the missile during one CPI.
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Figure 5.24: Induced False Target
5.5 Testing Jamming Scheme with DBS Rail
In order to test the theory developed in this chapter and demonstrate the practical imple-
mentation of it, real measurements were taken in a laboratory. The aim of the measure-
ments was twofold; to show that the developed theory is correct and false targets appear
in the correct location, as well as to show that the positions of the false target change
accordingly, when various parameters of the seeker trajectory are erroneously estimated.
The errors caused by incorrect seeker trajectory estimation will be discussed in the next
chapter. The aims of the experiment were met using physical antenna movement, by slid-
ing an antenna across an aperture with respect to a stationary target. The movement was
carried out in steps and was used to simulate the linear motion of a missile to test the
developed theory.
A thorough explanation of the rail is provided in Chapter 4. However, a brief summary of
the rail will now be provided for convenience. The rail used is 2 m long and is driven by a
CHAPTER 5. GENERATING FALSE TARGETS AGAINST DBS MODES 119
‘NEMA 17’ stepper motor, as shown in Figure 5.25. The motor used had 0.9◦ resolution
with 400 steps per 360◦ revolution. The breakout board used to interface the Arduino to
the stepper motor, was an A4988 ‘StepStick’ driver board.
Figure 5.25: Experimental DBS Rail
For the measurements, two pyramidal horn antennas were used, as shown in Figure
5.26.
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Figure 5.26: Experimental Layout
The measurements were completed in the far-field region of the antennas. No beam
steering was used (mechanically or electronically) during the measurement, but the re-
ceiving antenna was kept inside the main beam of the transmitter for all of the transmitted








where W is the width of the antenna at the flared end. This means at a range of 4 m, the





and therefore ≈ 2.34 m.
The waveforms were generated with a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP),
made by National Instruments (NI-2943R). LabVIEW was used to control both the USRP
and the Arduino and Matlab was embedded into the LabView program to design the wave-
forms. Table 5.7 shows the signal variables for the measurements and Figure 5.26 shows
the geometry of the measurement.
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Table 5.7: USRP Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 5 GHz
Bandwidth B 30 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Sampling Rate Fs 80 MHz
Assumed Missile Velocity V 60 m/s
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50µs
Number of Pulses M 128
False Target in Cross-Range Only
By using a slightly modified version of Eq. (5.59), a false target can be induced at a
desired location by modifying the transmitted waveform to incorporate an incremental
shift. The modification was necessary due to one-way (instead of two-way) propagation,
as shown in Figure 5.26. In order to create an ‘echo’ for reference, two pulses were
transmitted. The first pulse was unmodified (where α and τ j are set to zero) for the ‘echo’.
The second pulse was modified using the corresponding values for τ j and α to create the
false target. The variables of the trajectory (V , R0 and x0) and the carrier frequency, were
assumed to be known to the jammer. Following the same scheme used for a pulsed DBS















i2π fcα(t1 + kPRI)
) (5.67)





































× exp(i2π fcαt1)exp(i2π fcαkPRI)
(5.68)
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For a fixed range bin, the phase terms containing t1 will be constant from pulse to pulse.
This therefore means they can be placed into the term γ̂R , which contains the other con-
stant phase terms. This gives the final received signal as



















Eq.(5.69) shows that for a pulsed waveform, introducing a false target in a fixed range
bin is equivalent to introducing an incremental phase shift from pulse to pulse. This
will be exploited for the experimental demonstration of the results where a ‘stop and go’
method is employed to carry out measurements without the use of a DFRM. The ‘stop
and go’ method has been used solely for the scope of demonstrating the jamming tech-
nique in the laboratory. As shown in Eq. (5.51), a higher velocity or varying PRF does
not affect the analytical performance of the proposed solution as long as the narrowband
approximation in Eq. (5.50) holds (which is commonly the case for the velocities of the
missiles under consideration in this research). From Eq. (5.69) and for a fixed range bin,
the Doppler shift can be induced with respect to slow-time (kPRI) and not fast time. As
shown in Figure 5.25, the range bin will be fixed for the experiment, enabling the ‘stop
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A transmitted and received waveform is shown in Figure 5.27 with a pulse width of
10µs.
The the corresponding frequency spectrums with a bandwidth of 30 MHz are shown
in Figure 5.28. The figures show that the transmitted and received bandwidths are the
same. The range profiles of the scenario are shown in Figure 5.29.
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Figure 5.28: Frequency Spectrum of Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.29: Range Profiles of ‘Echo’ and False Target
CHAPTER 5. GENERATING FALSE TARGETS AGAINST DBS MODES 125
Figure 5.30 shows that a false target can be induced to have a cross-range position of
10m. The reference of the antenna location is at 2.65 m. The result gives clean range and
Doppler profiles at the correct positions. With a bandwidth of 30 MHz, the null-to-null
width of the main lobe of the range profile should be 10m to give a 3 dB range-resolution
of 5 m, which the plot labels show. Using the values in Table 5.7, the Doppler resolution








= 0.42 m (5.73)
which is shown in the Figure.
Figure 5.30: Range and Doppler Slices of ‘Echo’ and Jamming Target
The final result is given in Figure 5.31 which shows a range-Doppler map and a DBS
image of the reference target and false target. The expected one-way Doppler value for
the false target in the range-Doppler map is 2500 Hz which was remapped to give a cross-
range position of 10 m in the DBS image.
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Figure 5.31: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of ‘Echo’ and Jamming Target
False Target with Additive Range and Cross-Range
Following the method in the previous sub section, the next step was to create a false
target with an additive range and cross-range. Using the derived jamming scheme, a
false target was created at 35 m in range and 60 m in cross-range. A transmitted and
received waveform for a single target is shown in Figure 5.32 and the corresponding
frequency spectrums in Figure 5.33. The figures show a transmitted pulse width of 10 µs
and bandwidth of 30 MHz.
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Figure 5.32: Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.33: Frequency Spectrum of Transmitted and Received Waveforms
Figure 5.34 shows the range profiles of the scenario and shows two profiles, one for
the reference echo and one for the false target.
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Figure 5.34: Range Profiles of ‘Echo’ and False Target
Figure 5.35 shows the range and cross-range (Doppler) profiles of the false target. The
figures show the false target to have the correct range and cross-range positions of 35 m
and 60 m, respectively.
Figure 5.35: Range and Doppler Slices of ‘Echo’ and Jamming Target
The final result of the scenario is given in Figure 5.36 which shows a range-Doppler
map and DBS image. The expected Doppler value for the false target in the range-Doppler
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map is 2285.7 Hz which was remapped to give a cross-range position of 60 m in the DBS
image. The ‘echo’ reference target was also remapped to be at the correct cross-range
value of 2.65 m. These figures show clean false targets at the expected locations.
Figure 5.36: Range-Doppler Map and DBS Image of ‘Echo’ and Jamming Target
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented two implementation methods to create false targets in the DBS
image of a missile seeker. The first method was to repeat the waveforms of the seeker
with an incremental delay. This was tested with simulations and shown to be effective in
principle. The problem with this method, is that it requires incredibly precise timings (in
the order of picoseconds) and is therefore difficult to realise in practice.
Building upon the first method, the second method repeats the waveforms of the seeker
with a constant time delay and time varying additive Doppler shift, to create the false
target. This technique will be easier to realise in practice against narrowband radars.
The experimental results show that the second technique can place false targets at precise
locations, if the trajectory of the missile is known.
The derived theory shows that the Doppler shift the jammer applies to the waveform of
the seeker is dependant on three properties, velocity, cross-range and down-range. All
of these parameters can be incorrectly estimated and will affect the position of the false
targets in varying amounts. Chapter 6 will investigate the effect of using these parameters
with incorrect values on the position of the false target and which parameters give the
largest sources of error.
Chapter 6
Assessment of Errors in False Targets
6.1 Introduction
In this thesis, all of the methods of introducing false targets into DBS images rely on
knowledge of the trajectory of the seeker, as well as the ability to create high fidelity
copies of the received waveform. This is to be able to modify and transmit a perfect
jamming waveform to create a perfect false target, in terms of location. This chapter
explores the effects and implications to the position of the false targets when errors are
systematically introduced and controlled.
The derived theory and experimental results will show that the largest cause of error in the
position of the false target is the velocity estimation, followed by downrange and cross-
range estimations when R0 >> x0. The theory also shows that the initial phase of the
jamming frequency shift, does not affect the location of the false target.
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6.2 Measurement Error Theory
In order for the jammer to correctly modify the waveforms, data from a tracking radar
will need to be given to the jamming system. This would likely be from the on-board
surveillance and tracking radars that military ships will use. To better understand the
size and scale of the errors, parameters for a generic tracking radar have been used to
calculate the expected magnitude of measurement errors (for a single pulse) that a radar
could theoretically have. These parameters are shown in Table 6.1. A tracker could
potentially improve on these errors, so the equations are used to gain an understanding of
the magnitude of the respective errors, in a general case. These errors occur when taking
various measurements about a target in the presence of Gaussian white noise. General
equations for measurement errors for azimuth, range and Doppler, respectively, are listed

















where R is the target range, θ3dB is the 3 dB beamwidth of the radar antenna, ∆t is the
dwell time on the target and SNR is the signal to noise ratio. With instantaneous band-
widths in the order of 100s of MHz, the range errors induced by poor a SNR are small
(less than the resolution cell). With a bandwidth of 100 MHz, the range resolution is
1.5m. The expected errors in the measured Doppler shift with an SNR of 3 dB are in the
order of 1% when the missile is travelling directly towards the tracking radar at 270 m/s.
A low value for SNR was deliberately used to generate larger theoretical errors. Whilst
the range and velocity measurement errors are small, relative to the range resolution of the
CHAPTER 6. ASSESSMENT OF ERRORS IN FALSE TARGETS 133
radar and velocity of the missile, these measurement errors can be significantly increased
in the presence of jamming of the tracking radar (which provides tracking data to the DBS
jammer).
Table 6.1: Generic Tracking Radar Parameters
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 3 GHz
Bandwidth B 100 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 20 kHz
3 dB Horizontal Beamwidth θ 2◦
Dwell Time ∆t 1 ms
Assumed Low SNR SNR 3 dB
Range R 20 km
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6.2.1 Erroneous Trajectory Estimation
For the jammer to accurately place a false target at the desired location, it requires knowl-
edge of the seeker position and velocity. The previous chapter described the jamming
theory to create a perfect false target in the seeker DBS image. Eq (5.50) and Eq (5.51)
showed the jamming waveform the seeker would receive and what a perfect jamming re-
sponse would be, respectively. For convenience, they have been re-listed here. The seeker
would receive














and an ideal target located at (x0 +δx,R0 +δR) would generate an echo signal of

















Chapter 5 also derived the value of α in the jamming modification. The result of this












The variables V , x0 and R0 in Eq. (6.6) can be incorrectly estimated by varying











where the scalar variables xε , Rε and Vε are the numerical ratio between the estimated
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value of the variable and the true value for cross-range, downrange and velocity respec-
tively. For example, if the true velocity of the missile is 300 m/s but the jammer estimates
it to be 360m/s, then Vε =
V j
V = 1.2. Incorporating this into the waveform in Eq. (6.4), the
resultant waveform would be





































If there were no errors in the missile trajectory, Eq. 6.8 would simplify to Eq. (6.5). To
obtain the cross-range position of the target, the seeker would then invert the Doppler
equation to map for the cross-range position at the corresponding range bin of the target.
Under the assumption that the jammer has perfectly shifted the false target in down-range,
the cross-range position for the false target will be











Figure 6.1 shows how the cross-range position of the false target will shift when xε , Rε
and Vε from Eq. (6.11) are systematically varied for a seeker, where V = 270 m/s, R0 =











The expected trajectories for the missile will generally be such that R0 >> x0 and as the
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cross-range component of the trajectory will be small, relative to the down-range com-
ponent, errors in cross-range position yield smaller errors than for down-range errors. A
simulation of a typical scenario geometry, shown in Figure 6.1, demonstrates this prin-
ciple and shows that an erroneous velocity estimation will yield the largest errors in the
position of the false target.
The purpose of a military system jamming a missile is to avoid being hit by it or damaged
by a close detonation. Therefore, it is likely to be more desirable to create a false target at
a location further away than intended, than closer, to avoid being hit or damaged. Using
this principle, Figure 6.1 shows it is better to underestimate the cross-range and down-
range variables and overestimate the velocity magnitude variable. This is a general result,
which will hold when R0 >> x0.
Figure 6.1: Resultant Cross-Range Position with Varying Errors when V = 270 m/s, R0 =
14 km, x0 = 0.5 km, δR = 200 m and δx = 300 m.
Using the same co-ordinates as those in Figure 6.1 (V = 270 m/s, R0 = 14 km, x0 = 0.5
km, δR = 200 m and δx = 300 m) and by using the signal variables detailed in Table 6.2,
six simulations were carried out to validate the result obtained in Figure 6.1.
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Table 6.2: Simulation Waveform Variables
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 36 GHz
Bandwidth B 40 MHz
Pulse Width τ 3 µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 10 kHz
Number of Pulses M 64
Dwell Time td 6.4 ms
Doppler Resolution δ f 156.25 Hz
Table 6.3 provides the results of the six simulations, with the actual plots of the results
shown in Appendix B. The results show that Eq. (6.10) can be used to predict the cross-
range error of the false target. All of the results should be at 0.8 km, but are incorrect due
to the respective error scalars being applied to the jammer Eq. (6.11).
Table 6.3: Error Variables
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6.2.2 Experimental results
Following the simulation in Figure 6.1, the next step was to take measurements in exactly
the same way as Chapter 5, to compare the simulated results with experimental results.
The experiments in Chapter 5 showed that a false target could be created, if the trajectory
of the seeker is known. Figure 6.2 shows the schematic of the experimental setup.
Figure 6.2: Experimental Layout
The method for creating the false target was almost identical to Chapter 5, except that
deliberately incorrect values of α was used, with the notation αε . Following the same
scheme used for a pulsed DBS system from the previous section and by using Eq. (5.59),















i2π fcαε(t1 + kPRI)
)
(6.12)
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Following the same format in Chapter 5, for a fixed range bin, the phase terms containing
t1 will be constant from pulse to pulse. This therefore means they can be placed into

















































αε was calculated from Eq. (6.7). By using Eq. (6.10) and the values in Table 6.4,
Figure 6.3 shows how the cross-range position for the generated target will change with
each error of velocity magnitude, cross-range and down-range. The desired position of
the false target in cross-range was 60 m and this is represented by the red circle in the
figure. This is the benchmark position and the false target would be at that location if
all three error scalars (xε , Rε and Vε ) are equal to 1. Each plot represents a single source
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error. For example, the solid orange line varies Rε between 0.5 and 4, when xε and Vε are
equal to 1, for every point on the line.
The method of generating Figures 6.1 and 6.3 is the same, but they are different due to
using different geometries to simulate an example real-world scenario and the small-scale
laboratory environment.
Figure 6.3: Simulated Resultant Cross-Range Position For Each Error Scalar when V = 60 m/s,
R0 =4m, x0 = 2.65m, δR = 31m and δx = 57.35m.
To verify Figure 6.3, several more measurements were taken with the USRP, using the
values in Table 6.4.
Errors were systematically introduced as shown in Table 6.5. The table details the
resultant cross-range position should the jamming equation include errors from one par-
ticular error per measurement. For example, the top line of the Table states that the ve-
locity scalar, Vε has a value of 2. This means that if the jammer uses the same variables
as detailed in Table 5.6, every other variable was assumed to be correct, but the jammer
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Table 6.4: USRP Variables
Carrier Frequency fc 5 GHz
Bandwidth B 30 MHz
Pulse Width τ 10 µs
Sampling Rate Fs 80 MHz
Assumed Missile Velocity V 60 m/s
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50 µs
Number of Pulses M 128
modified the waveform to include a velocity of 120 m/s and not 60 m/s.
Table 6.5: Error Variables
Variable Scalar Experimental Result (m) Simulated Result (m) Difference (m)
Vε
0.8 53.16 52.63 0.53
2 97.52 96.85 0.67
Rε
0.8 55.96 55.62 0.34
2 66.09 65.42 0.67
xε
0.8 65.05 64.1 0.95
4 -0.8539 -1.515 0.66
Following from Figure 6.1 and by using Eq. (6.10), Figure 6.4 shows how the cross-
range position for the generated target will change with each error of velocity magnitude,
cross-range and down-range. The experimental data points have been overlaid onto the
simulated errors, to show that they match the expected values.
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Figure 6.4: Resultant Cross-Range Position For Each Error Scalar
The cross-range (remapped Doppler) profiles for each of the measurements are shown
in Figures 6.5, 6.7 and 6.6 respectively. For each of the plots, the intended cross-range
position of the target (if there were no errors) was 60 m. Figure 6.5 shows the resultant
cross-range position of the false target when xε is 0.8 and 4.0.
CHAPTER 6. ASSESSMENT OF ERRORS IN FALSE TARGETS 143
xε = 0.8 xε = 4
Figure 6.5: Cross-Range Position of False Target with Erroneous Initial Seeker Cross-Range
Estimation
Figure 6.6 shows the resultant cross-range position of the false target when Rε is 0.8
and 2.0.
Rε = 0.8 Rε = 2
Figure 6.6: Cross-Range Position of False Target with Erroneous Initial Seeker Downrange
Estimation
Figure 6.7 shows the resultant cross-range position of the false target when Vε is 0.8
and 2.0.
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Vε = 0.8 Vε = 2
Figure 6.7: Cross-Range Position of False Target with Erroneous Initial Seeker Velocity
Estimation
Figures 6.5, 6.7 and 6.6 show that the predictions in Figure 6.3 can be used to predict
the resultant position of the false target in cross-range for the corresponding error scalars
(xε , Rε and Vε ).
6.3 Initial Phase of Jammer
From a DBS perspective, the intial phase of the jammer response will not effect the false
target. From Eq. (6.18), if the jammer adds a Doppler shift with α and has an initial phase
offset of φ , then the final result at the seeker would be













exp(i2π fcαt +φ) (6.18)
Providing that the initial phase was not time varying, this will not affect the false target
result at the seeker. Using the same co-ordinates as those in Figure 6.1 (V = 270 m/s, R0
= 14 km, x0 = 0.5 km, δR = 200 m and δx = 300 m) and the signal variables detailed in
Table 6.2, a simulation was carried out to verify this. In the simulation, the value of φ was
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nominally π2 so that




















The results shown in Figure 6.8 show that the jamming target is exactly as intended
and with clean profiles. This demonstrates that for DBS, the initial phase of the jamming
Doppler shift will not affect the false target, providing that the phase offset is not time
varying.
Figure 6.8: Range and Cross-Range Profiles of Target with Initial Jammer Phase Offset of π2
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6.4 Conclusion
The experimental results show that the jamming techniques detailed in Chapter 5 can
be successful at creating a false target at a specific location. Without the presence of
jamming, the theoretical errors of the tracking radar would result in small errors in the
position of the false target. However, these errors could increase and become significant
should the tracking performance be degraded with jamming or evasion manoeuvres which
the missile might perform to evade detection or tracking. The tracking radar errors can
also be increased when a salvo of missiles is fired, saturating the tracker or by co-operative
or ‘smart’ missiles collaborating in a way to make it harder to identify and track them.
This will be discussed further in the next chapter.
The expected trajectories for the missile will generally be such that R0 >> x0 and as
the cross-range component of the trajectory will be small, relative to the down-range
component, errors in cross-range position yield smaller errors than for down-range errors.
The largest source of error in the false target position is that of the velocity parameter. As
a general result, the experimental and simulated results therefore show it would be better
to concentrate resources on estimating the velocity rather than down-range or cross-range
parameters of the incoming missile.
The purpose of jamming a missile or tracking radar is to avoid being hit by the missile or
tracked by the enemy. Therefore, it is likely to be more desirable to have a false target at
a location further away than intended, than closer, to avoid being hit. Using this principle,
it is better to underestimate the cross-range and down-range variables and overestimate
the velocity magnitude variable. This is a general result, which will hold when R0 >> x0.
Chapter 7
General Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 General Conclusion
Chapter 4 of this thesis presented a low-cost experimental setup, capable of taking DBS
images of stationary targets. The DBS images of a stationary target show DBS theory in
action and how DBS can be used to resolve targets where a real beam cannot, by creating
an aperture across the target being imaged. The overall result of the DBS system is that
it can be used to test jamming schemes and waveforms to further understand and verify
results obtained from simulations.
Chapter 5 presented two implementation methods to create false targets in the DBS image
of a missile seeker. The first method was to repeat the waveforms of the seeker with an
incremental time delay. This was tested with simulations and shown to be effective in
principle. The problem with this method, is that it requires incredibly precise timings (in
the order of picoseconds) and is therefore difficult to realise in practice.
Building upon the first method, the second method repeats the waveforms of the seeker
with a constant time delay and a Doppler shift, to create the false target. This technique
will be easier to realise in practice against narrowband radars. The experimental results
show that the second technique can place false targets at precise locations, if the trajectory
of the missile is known. The derived theory shows that the Doppler shift the jammer ap-
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plies to the waveform of the seeker is dependant on three properties, velocity, cross-range
and down-range. All of these parameters can be incorrectly estimated and will affect the
position of the false targets in varying amounts.
The experimental results show that the jamming techniques detailed in Chapter 5 can
be successful at creating a false target at a specific location. Without the presence of
jamming, the theoretical errors a tracking radar would have result in small errors in the
position of the false target. However, these errors could increase and become significant
should the tracking performance be degraded with jamming or evasion manoeuvres which
the missile might perform to evade detection or tracking. The tracking radar errors can
also be increased when a salvo of missiles is fired, saturating the tracker or by co-operative
or ‘smart’ missiles collaborating in a way to make it harder to identify and track them.
The expected trajectories for the missile will generally be such that R0 >> x0 and as the
cross-range component of the trajectory will be small, relative to the down-range compo-
nent, errors in cross-range position yield smaller errors than for down-range errors. The
largest source of error in the false target position is that of the velocity parameter. As a
general result, the experimental and simulated results therefore show it would be better
to concentrate resources on estimating the velocity rather than down-range or cross-range
parameters of the incoming missile.
The purpose of jamming a missile or tracking radar is to avoid being hit by the missile or
tracked by the enemy. Therefore, it is likely to be more desirable to have a false target at
a location further away than intended, than closer, to avoid being hit. Using this principle,
it is better to underestimate the cross-range and down-range variables and overestimate
the velocity magnitude variable. This is a general result, which will hold when R0 >> x0.
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7.2 Summary of Contributions
This section is used to detail the main contributions presented in this thesis in a concise
form. The main contributions are:
CH. 4 - Experimental Setup: Construction of a system capable of taking DBS images
and demonstrating jamming techniques against DBS. This chapter formed part of the
novel contributions of this thesis, as it was main experimental setup for the results ob-
tained in Chapters 5 and 6.
CH. 5 - Inserting False Targets into a DBS Image: Two methods of implementation
to insert false targets into DBS images are presented in this chapter. The first method
proposes repeat jamming with a time-varying delay, the second details how to create false
targets at a precise location within a seeker DBS image, by both delaying and adding a
Doppler shift to received waveforms. The first method is tested with simulations and the
second was tested with both simulations and measurements with the DBS system detailed
in Chapter 4.
CH. 6 - Effects of Errors in Trajectory Estimation: Chapter 5 details the required
parameters about the seeker trajectory to insert a false target into the seeker DBS image.
This chapter describes the effects of tracking errors on the position of the false target.
This is analysed analytically, with simulations and with experimental results. The results
are used to assess the practical implementation of the second jamming scheme.
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7.3 Future Work
7.3.1 ‘Chopping’
This thesis presented jamming against a DBS system which was using LFM waveforms.
The jamming scheme repeats the entire waveform back towards the seeker with a modifi-
cation. Using this method against a radar that is not using waveform agility or PRI jitter
is feasible, since the DRFM can take a copy of the the victim seeker waveform, store for
modification and resample periodically at set intervals. This also overcomes the problem
of range because the jammer can transmit the jamming waveform at any time during the
victim seeker PRI and not just when it receives the waveform of the seeker. For example,
if a DRFM samples an entire pulse of 10 µs, that corresponds to a delayed range of ap-
proximately 1.5 km.
A method to overcome this problem is to sample only a portion of the received waveform,
instead of the whole pulse. This method is also known as ‘chopping’, as detailed in [Abu
El-Fadl et al., 2014]. Against an LFM waveform, this will result in waveform of a shorter
pulse, with a lower bandwidth than the original waveform. When the seeker receives the
shorter waveform, there will still be a correlation with the transmitted waveform as it is
partially matched to it. This will result in a false target with a larger range resolution
(due to the lower bandwidth) and will result in the false target being closer to the vic-
tim seeker than the jammer actually is, due to the mis-matched correlation. The second
method of implementation detailed in Chapter 5 should be developed further and used
with the ‘chopping’ method.
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7.3.2 Detection of DBS
In order for the jammer to jam a seeker using the DBS mode, it needs to detect that it
is using DBS and not a different type of mode. It is difficult to differentiate DBS from
another type of mode from the waveform alone. For example, if the jammer receives an
LFM waveform, there are many modes the seeker couild be using such as DBS, SAR,
pulse-Doppler, etc. However, in order to perform DBS or SAR, there needs to be an off-
set angle between the target and the seeker. This means that the missile cannot be heading
directly towards the target being imaged but instead must fly at an offset and turn head
onto the target at a later time, once the target has been acquired.
As stated in the literature in Chapter 2, there is some unclassified research into optimising
trajectories for DBS. It is thought that the simplest way to identify the use of the DBS
mode is through the trajectory of the seeker. Further research could study typical trajec-
tories of missiles using conventional monopulse radar seekers, infrared seekers and DBS
or SAR seekers and develop algorithms to discriminate between the different modes and
obtain confidence levels to be more certain as to which type of countermeasure should be
used.
7.3.3 Low-Cost DRFM
The use of DRFMs throughout this thesis has been assumed. The jamming techniques
described in Chapter 5 require the ability to create high fidelity copies of the waveform
of the victim radar, which would be achieved through the use of a DRFM system. Testing
the jamming with a DRFM will bring additional complexities to the experimental setup
such as introducing waveform sampling errors, latencies and possible jittering effects.
As discussed in the literature survey in Chapter 2, there are a number of publications de-
tailing the use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) DRFM systems [Heagney, 2018,
Zhang Peng, 2015, Min Xie et al., 2015]. Future research could aim to construct a rel-
atively low-cost DRFM system and test the jamming schemes in real time against the
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schemes derived in Chapter 5. The experiments presented in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 have all
been undertaken in steps to remove the requirement to have instantaneous processing. By
constructing a low-cost COTS DRFM system, more insight could be gained into jammer
latency, modulations and glint, caused by hardware errors of the low-cost DRFM system.
7.3.4 False Target Credibility
The proposed jamming schemes in this thesis aim to produce false targets that would look
like valid skin-returns by multiplying the seeker waveforms by the corresponding Doppler
shifts that a target would have if it was at the location the jammer was trying to create.
However, when trying to replicate complex targets (such as a ship) there are many more
factors to include such as the sea state and glint caused by target motion, target velocities,
jammer location with respect to the target it is trying to protect, jammer motion caused by
sea state or gusts of wind if airborne/off-board and so forth. Future research should also
seek to include realistic fluctuations caused by the factors mentioned above.
The probability of the seeker accepting or rejecting the false targets generated by the
jammer is a complex subject and it would depend on the target scenes being imaged (e.g.
ships on seas, tanks on ground) as well as the specific target classification algorithms
employed by the missile seeker. Therefore, the research should also be continued to
assess the probability of the seeker accepting or rejecting the false targets generated using
the described algorithms.
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7.3.5 Future Work Summary
This thesis has presented two implementation methods to create false targets in a DBS im-
age, as well as an analysis of errors caused by incorrect tracking of the missile trajectory.
The next steps to continue this work would be to first construct a low-cost DRFM system
to implement the schemes in Chapter 5 as well as additional methods such as ‘chopping’.
The second continuation would then be to develop target classification algrorithms and
test the jamming schemes with the DRFM system against these algorithms to better un-
derstand how they can be improved to maximise the probability of the seeker accepting
the false targets as true target.
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Appendix B
Cross-Range Errors - Simulated Results
Figure B.1: Vε = 0.8 Figure B.2: Vε = 2
Resultant Cross-Range Positions with Varying Velocity Error
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Figure B.3: Rdε = 0.8 Figure B.4: Rdε = 2
Resultant Cross-Range Positions with Varying Down-Range Error
Figure B.5: x0ε = 0.8 Figure B.6: x0ε = 2
Resultant Cross-Range Positions with Varying Cross-Range Error
